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What Lies Beneath: 
Interpretive Methodology, Constitutional Authority, 
and the Case of Originalism 
Christopher J. Peters* 
It is a surprising fact of American constitutional practice that we 
cannot agree on a methodology of constitutional interpretation. 
What can explain our disagreement? Is it the product of a deeper, 
principled dispute about the meaning of constitutional law? Or is it 
just a veneer—a velvet curtain obscuring what is really a back-room 
brawl over political outcomes? 
This Article suggests that these, in essence, are the only viable 
possibilities. Either we disagree about interpretation because we 
disagree (or are confused) about constitutional authority—about why 
the Constitution binds us in the first place; or we disagree because 
we disagree politically about the particular results of using one 
methodology versus another. 
This Article contends that methods of interpretation must be 
defended by reference to accounts of constitutional authority. It 
takes as its case in point the family of interpretive approaches known 
as originalism, which favors resolving constitutional issues according 
to a meaning fixed at the Framing. Originalism is an apt case study 
because it currently is ascendant in both academic theory and 
judicial practice and, not incidentally, because it often is suspected of 
being a cover for controversial political commitments. 
This Article illustrates the relationship between interpretation 
and authority by assessing the “natural rights” defense of an 
originalist Constitution offered by the influential New Originalist 
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Randy Barnett. Barnett’s account fails, the Article contends, because 
it cannot explain the authority of the Constitution it purports to 
justify. But its failure underscores the centrality of authority to 
methods of interpretation. 
The Article then examines three general accounts of 
constitutional authority that might be thought to entail originalism. 
Accounts based on “consent” or “popular sovereignty,” while 
rhetorically appealing, lack any basis in the realities of modern 
society. Accounts based on what the Article terms “Moral 
Guidance”—the supposedly superior wisdom of the Framing 
process—are both descriptively implausible and conceptually 
problematic. Only accounts based on “Dispute Resolution,” such as 
the well-known “Footnote Four” approach from the Supreme 
Court’s Carolene Products decision, can overcome the fatal flaws of 
these other accounts. But Dispute Resolution can support only a 
selective, modest use of originalism. 
Originalists, then, are left with a choice, the Article concludes. 
They can moderate their interpretive methodology as the Footnote 
Four approach suggests. Or they can insist on thoroughgoing 
originalism—with nothing to back it up but the bare desire for 
politically controversial results. 
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I. INTERPRETATION AND DISAGREEMENT 
Here is a remarkable fact. Americans live under the most 
successful written constitution in history, a document that over 
more than two centuries has survived civil war, endured tumultuous 
debates over race and regulation and rights and the role of 
government, inspired countless imitations around the world, and 
earned the nearly religious reverence of citizens rich and poor, urban 
and rural, natural-born and naturalized, Republican and Democrat. 
And yet we cannot agree on the seemingly fundamental question of 
how that document should be interpreted. 
Our disagreement is not just an academic one, though it thrives 
in academic circles. It is both real and important: real, in the sense 
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that actual constitutional decision-makers are swept up in it; and 
important, in the sense that some of those decision-makers are 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court. 
Consider two influential books by current Justices. Antonin 
Scalia’s A Matter of Interpretation is a “New Originalist” manifesto, a 
typically merciless (but far from humorless) battle cry on behalf of 
“original meaning” interpretation.1 Stephen Breyer’s Active Liberty is 
a spirited defense of a flexible, adaptable “living Constitution” that 
reads like a reply brief to Justice Scalia despite never mentioning 
Scalia by name.2 These are men whose job it is to render binding 
interpretations of the Constitution, and yet they could hardly 
disagree more fundamentally about how that job should be 
performed. 
It is relatively rare for sitting Justices to defend their 
methodology at length and in public, as Justices Scalia and Breyer 
have done. But it is common for clashes of methodology to decide 
constitutional cases, or at least to be deployed as if they will decide 
them. Roe v. Wade, probably the most contentious Supreme Court 
decision since Dred Scott, pitted what would now be called the “living 
constitutionalism” of Justice Blackmun against the textualism of 
Justice White and the originalism of Justice Rehnquist.3 (Living 
constitutionalism won that round.) NFIB v. Sebelius, the recent 
 
 1. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 37–39 
(1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, Common-Law Courts]. 
 2. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(2005). 
 3. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (Blackmun, J., for the Court): 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of 
decisions, however, . . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or 
a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution. . . . 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept 
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the 
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the 
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy. 
See also id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting) (“With all due respect, I dissent. I find nothing in the 
language or history of the Constitution to support the Court’s judgments. The Court simply 
fashions and announces a new constitutional right . . . .”); id. at 171, 174 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“To reach its result, the Court necessarily has had to find within the Scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the 
Amendment.”). 
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“Obamacare” case, matched the increasingly vehement originalism 
of, respectively, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice 
Thomas against the levelheaded pragmatism of Justice Ginsburg.4 
(Point to the originalists.) There are far too many other examples to 
list. 
We have managed to squeak by for more than two hundred years 
without a consensus approach to constitutional interpretation. 
Perhaps our interpretive disagreement even deserves some credit for 
this: no single approach dominates, so everyone’s preferred approach 
is always in play. Still, it is profoundly strange that we agree so 
broadly that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land but 
diverge so widely on how to determine just what that law requires of 
us. 
I will not attempt the Sisyphean task of resolving that 
disagreement in this Article. But I will try to construct (perhaps to 
excavate) a framework around which the components of a resolution 
might be assembled. I will contend that methodological debates 
must first be carried out as foundational debates about the 
Constitution’s authority—about why the Constitution we are 
interpreting binds us in the first place. Interpretive methods 
presuppose accounts of constitutional authority. So we should focus 
on the question of authority before we enter the methodological fray. 
Answering the question of authority may solve the problem of 
interpretation for us—or at least make the outlines of that problem 
more clear. 
I also will evaluate the reasonably plausible attempts to answer 
the authority question, the question of why the Constitution 
obligates us. I will find all of them wanting in some ways and most 
of them wanting in ways that are fatal. And I will suggest that a 
 
 4. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (Roberts, J., for the 
Court) (“The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it. . . .”) 
(emphasis in original); id. at 2642, 2644 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If 
this provision ‘regulates’ anything, it is the failure to maintain minimum essential coverage. One 
might argue that it regulates that failure by requiring it to be accompanied by payment of a 
penalty. But that failure—that abstention from commerce—is not ‘Commerce.’”); id. at 2677, 
2677 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I adhere to my view that ‘the very 
notion of a “substantial effects” test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the 
original understanding of Congress’ powers . . . .’”); id. at 2609, 2616 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Consistent with the Framers’ intent, we have 
repeatedly emphasized that Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause is dependent upon 
‘practical’ considerations, including ‘actual experience.’”). 
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persuasive approach to interpretive methodology must be built upon 
the most promising account of authority. If methodology doesn’t 
follow authority, then it is deeply flawed methodology. Perhaps 
worse, it is methodology that can only be defended as a means to 
generate the interpreter’s preferred results. 
I will frame my arguments here around a particular family of 
interpretive methodologies that usually travel under the name 
originalism. I use originalism as my case in point for several reasons. 
First, originalism is ascendant; it may not yet dominate the bench, 
and it certainly doesn’t dominate the academy, but its star 
undeniably is on the rise. So in focusing on originalism, I am 
focusing on a subject of considerable contemporary interest. 
Second, largely for the first reason, there is far more good recent 
writing about originalism (pro and con) than about any competing 
methodology, giving me a great deal of material to work with. 
Third, contemporary originalist theory features enough 
commonality that it makes sense to consider “originalism” as a 
relatively cohesive approach—much more so than the various 
nonoriginalist methods sometimes lumped together under the label 
“living constitutionalism.” 
And I must admit to a somewhat discreditable fourth reason. As 
a nonoriginalist, I have long labored under the suspicion that 
originalism is driven by outcomes rather than the other way 
around—that, to quote the pugnacious title of an article by a fellow 
nonoriginalist, “originalism is bunk,”5 a sophistic and increasingly 
sophisticated attempt to put constitutional lipstick on a nakedly 
political pig. I doubt that I am alone among nonoriginalists in my 
skepticism. This Article presents an opportunity to prod and test 
that skepticism a bit, by examining what might lie beneath 
originalism other than political opportunism. 
My conclusions do not validate my skepticism, exactly. But they 
don’t entirely dispel it either. 
I begin in Part II by introducing, tentatively, the relationship 
between interpretive methodology and constitutional authority. I 
present a “Cynical Narrative” of originalism, one that shamelessly 
indulges my skepticism about its motivations. Then I examine the 
account of constitutional authority and its connection to originalism 
offered by Randy Barnett, a prominent New Originalist. I argue that 
 
 5. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
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Barnett’s account is, at bottom, no more than a deeply theorized 
version of my Cynical Narrative. And I use this contention to 
demonstrate originalism’s (or any methodology’s) need for a good 
underlying theory of authority. 
In Part III, I defend further the claim that authority is central to 
methodology. After defining my subject more carefully, in a way that 
takes account of the New Originalists’ distinction between 
constitutional “interpretation” and constitutional “construction,” I 
argue that interpretive approaches must be consistent with some 
theory of constitutional authority as a practical matter. And I explain 
why the claim made by Lawrence Solum, another New Originalist, 
that interpretive questions are in part non-normative does not 
threaten the authority/interpretation connection I am trying to draw. 
Having made a prima facie case for an intrinsic relationship 
between interpretation and authority, I devote the remainder of the 
Article to presenting, and critically assessing, three general accounts 
of constitutional authority that might plausibly lead towards 
originalism. If any of these accounts both succeeds as a justification 
of constitutional authority and entails originalism, then we have a 
viable alternative to the jaundiced Cynical Narrative of originalism’s 
underpinnings. But if no plausible account of constitutional 
authority also entails originalism, then the Cynical Narrative 
becomes more credible. 
In Part IV, I contend that the related concepts of consent and 
popular sovereignty, which sometimes are offered by originalists in 
support of their approach, cannot persuasively justify the authority 
of our Constitution or, probably, of any other constitution in the 
circumstances of modern political life. 
Part V tackles a considerably more nuanced attempt to justify 
constitutional authority that I call a Moral Guidance account. A Moral 
Guidance account locates authority in the supposedly superior 
wisdom of some aspect or aspects of the constitutional process, such 
as the Framing. In a certain form, it entails a strong version of 
originalism. But it also faces serious obstacles, some contingent on 
the circumstances of our actual Framing, some more conceptual and 
universal. I argue that these obstacles render Moral Guidance 
accounts implausible as justifications of constitutional authority and 
thus as defenses of originalism. 
Finally, in Part VI, I examine a very different way of justifying 
constitutional authority, which I call a Dispute Resolution account. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014 11:13 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
1258 
Dispute Resolution accounts attribute authority to the Constitution, 
not because its procedures are especially wise, but because they are 
especially fair or determinate and, as such, are capable of avoiding or 
resolving certain kinds of disputes that ordinary democracy cannot 
avoid or resolve. The best-known example of a Dispute Resolution 
account is the “representation reinforcement” approach suggested by 
the famous Footnote Four of the Carolene Products decision and later 
elaborated by John Hart Ely. I argue that this Footnote Four 
approach is viable as an account of constitutional authority—more 
viable, in any event, than its competitors. I also argue, however, that 
the Footnote Four approach supports at best a selective, modest 
form of originalism. 
In Part VII, I conclude that because constitutional interpretation 
and constitutional authority are joined at the hip, originalists face a 
choice. They can accept a moderate form of originalism, which is the 
only kind justified by a plausible theory of constitutional authority. 
Or they can insist on thoroughgoing originalism, with no normative 
warrant other than the bare desire for politically conservative results. 
II. ORIGINALISM, VALUES, AND AUTHORITY 
Let’s begin with a surprisingly difficult question. What exactly 
would be wrong with an approach to constitutional interpretation—
say, originalism—that can be defended only as a means of 
implementing certain politically controversial results? 
This Part answers that question by deploying the conceptual 
mechanics of constitutional authority—of the Constitution’s capacity 
to bind us. I introduce the concept of authority by posing a thought 
experiment involving a “Cynical Narrative” of originalism’s 
motivations, and then juxtaposing that thought experiment with the 
sophisticated and provocative New Originalist theory of Randy 
Barnett. Barnett’s theory fails to make sense of constitutional 
authority, I explain, and yet a good account of authority is required 
to debunk the Cynical Narrative. Originalism, or any interpretive 
methodology, must come to grips with the question of authority. 
Before going any further, however, I need to define with more 
care the “originalism” to which I will be referring throughout the 
Article. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014 11:13 AM 
1251 What Lies Beneath 
 1259 
A. “Originalism” 
Originalism is a type of answer to the fundamental, persistently 
unresolved question I referenced in my introduction, the question of 
interpretive methodology: how should courts (or other interpreters) go 
about the task of determining whether and how the Constitution 
applies to particular issues or disputes? Over the past quarter 
century or so, as Barnett proudly (and I think accurately) reports, 
originalism “has thrived like no other approach to interpretation” in 
American constitutional theory and practice.6 But what exactly is 
“originalism?” 
Both the core and the boundaries of originalism are contested, by 
originalists and by their critics;7 and, like most commonly used 
terms that invoke complex and disputed concepts (“democracy,” 
“the rule of law,” “family”), no doubt “originalism” often is used 
carelessly. It probably is impossible to define “originalism” in a way 
that is consistent with every careful use of the term, much less with 
every careless use of it. But we need not attempt that impossible 
project. For purposes of this Article, I will use “originalism” in the 
following rather general sense: 
Originalism holds that the application of the Constitution to an issue or 
dispute should be determined, to the extent possible, by its meaning at the time of 
framing or ratification. 
I think this definition is a fair statement of the common ground 
that unites most contemporary originalists.8 Within the spacious 
 
 6. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 
22 CONST. COMM. 257, 257 (2005) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumping Precedent]. 
 7. See, e.g., infra notes 9–16 and accompanying text. 
 8. In gaining some understanding of contemporary originalism and in fashioning this 
very general definition, I am indebted to the work of Lawrence Solum, who is both one of the 
leading theorists of contemporary originalism and a tireless chronicler of the movement. Solum’s 
paper “Semantic Originalism,” available only in draft form and online as of this writing, contains 
an extensive discussion of the history and current state of originalist thought, including points 
of dispute within originalism. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 13–27 (Nov. 22, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 [hereinafter 
Solum, Semantic Originalism]. 
I believe the general definition I offer in the text is consistent with Solum’s intricate 
attempt to define the core of originalism in “Semantic Originalism,” though it is far from 
coextensive with it. Solum offers the following statement of what he calls “Pure Normative 
Originalism”: “Constitutional practice should be substantially guided by the original public 
meaning of the text.” Id. at 30. The general statement I use here is similar to this and not 
inconsistent with it, though there are at least two differences. First, Solum specifies the meaning 
of the Constitution as “the original public meaning,” which rules out “original intent” positions. 
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margins of this general definition, of course, lurks much 
disagreement.9 For example, originalists disagree on how to 
determine the “meaning” of the Constitution at the time of its 
framing or ratification (and thus on whether “framing” or 
“ratification” is the operative event). Some originalists would 
determine original meaning by looking for the “intent” of the 
Framers;10 others look for the meaning that would have been 
attributed by a reasonable member of the public at the time the 
document was ratified (the “original public meaning”).11 
Originalists also disagree on how often the meaning of the text will 
be underdeterminate12 and, when it is, on how to “construe” the 
 
This is entirely consistent with Solum’s arguments regarding the semantic meaning of the 
Constitution, but for my purposes I want to include original-intent positions within the realm of 
the “originalism” I am examining. 
Second, Solum’s statement requires “constitutional practice” to be “substantially guided 
by” original public meaning. I take “constitutional practice” to be shorthand for “the application 
of the Constitution to an issue or dispute,” as I phrase it in my definition. See id. at 29 
(describing “constitutional practice”). It seems possible, however, that constitutional practice 
might be “substantially guided by” original public meaning without being “determined, to the 
extent possible” by that meaning, as my definition requires. In this sense Solum’s statement of 
“normative” originalism might be less demanding than my definition. 
 9. In briefly enumerating in the following text some of the points of disagreement 
among originalists, I will cite a few examples of each position; but I refer the reader to Solum’s 
work for a far better understanding of contemporary originalist theory than I can provide here, 
including citations to important statements and critiques of originalism. See Solum, Semantic 
Originalism, supra note 8; see also Larry Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 019: Originalism, LEGAL 
THEORY BLOG (last revised Feb. 19, 2012), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/ legal_theory_le_1.html [hereinafter 
Solum, Originalism]. 
 10. Leading statements of this “original intention” position include Robert H. Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); William H. Rehnquist, 
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY 
JUDICIARY (1977); Edwin Meese III, United States Attorney General, Speech Before the American 
Bar Association (July 9, 1985), reprinted in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47–54 
(Steven G. Calabresi, ed. 2007) [hereinafter ORIGINALISM]. 
 11. This appears to be the consensus position among originalists as of this writing. 
Prominent expositions include ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143–85 (1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERICA]; Gary Lawson, 
Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1992); SCALIA, Common-Law Courts, supra note 1; 
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of 
the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127 (2003); RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, 
LOST CONSTITUTION]; and Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws,104 YALE L.J. 541, 553 (1994). 
 12. See Larry Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 063: Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL THEORY 
BLOG, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2008/04/legal-theory-le.html (last 
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text to resolve the issue at hand despite this underdeterminacy.13 
They disagree on the extent to which original meaning (when it is 
determinate) contributes to the content of constitutional law: on 
whether original meaning is all there is to constitutional law,14 
whether original meaning is part of constitutional law but not all of 
it,15 or whether original meaning might become part of 
constitutional law but need not do so.16 And they disagree on other 
matters as well. 
The substance of these various disagreements need not concern 
us, however. Nothing significant in my arguments will turn on 
particular resolutions of these disputes or on other intricacies of 
originalist thought. Where differences within originalist theory 
might be relevant to what I have to say, I will try to note that fact. 
 
 
updated Dec. 23, 2012) (“Old Originalists seemed to believe that the original intentions of the 
framers fully determined the translation of the constitutional text into the correct set of legal 
rules: interpretation could do all the work.”). By “Old Originalists,” Solum seems to have in 
mind many or all of the theorists listed supra note 10. I would add to this list a progenitor of the 
so-called New Originalism, which looks not to original intent but to original public meaning: 
Antonin Scalia, who often writes or speaks as if the project of identifying original meaning is all 
there is to the application of the Constitution to particular disputes. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Lesser Evil]. 
 13. For originalist descriptions of the phenomenon of textual underdeterminacy, see 
Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 67–75; BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 
11, at 118–21. For a survey of differing originalist approaches to the project of “constitutional 
construction”—the application of the text when its original meaning runs out—see Solum, 
Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 75–79. 
 14. Solum believes that “no actual proponent of originalism has endorsed this extreme 
position.” Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 6. But “Old Originalist” beliefs that 
original meaning “can do all the work,” see supra note 12, seem to assume this position. If 
correctly identifying original meaning is capable of completely resolving all constitutional issues, 
one way or another, then original meaning just is constitutional law: there are no constitutional 
rules or commands other than those specified by original meaning. 
 15. This “moderate” position is the one necessarily assumed by Solum and other New 
Originalists who agree that constitutional “construction” is required to resolve issues once 
original meaning runs out. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 6–7, 67–75. It also 
is the position taken by originalists who believe the Court should presumptively defer to (at 
least some) nonoriginalist precedents. 
 16. This “weak” position is taken by those who believe that constitutional law qua law is 
created by judicial decisions, not by the sources relied upon by judges in making those decisions. 
See id. at 7–8, 8 n.26 (citing as an example Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and its 
Discontents, UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 08-07, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103569). 
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B. Originalism: A Cynical Narrative 
With the concept of originalism thus loosely defined, allow me 
to introduce the relationship between constitutional interpretation 
and constitutional authority with a brief thought experiment. 
Imagine that someone presents to you the following supposedly 
descriptive account of originalism:17 
The Cynical Narrative 
Contemporary originalism began in the 1970s, not as a 
principled theory of constitutional interpretation, but rather 
as a politically conservative device to critique liberal Warren 
Court and early Burger Court decisions18 like Roe v. Wade, 
Griswold v. Connecticut,19 and Miranda v. Arizona.20 
Originalism was a natural vehicle for this critique: it 
combined an appeal to patriotism and historical nostalgia 
(well-timed to coincide with the 1976 Bicentennial) with a 
popular sense that the Court had overreached in many of 
these cases. 
These early critical uses of originalism, designed as they were 
primarily for rhetorical purposes, were superficially appealing 
to those who shared the political commitments of their 
proponents but also, not surprisingly, were undertheorized. 
The first wave of originalists failed to carefully think through 
the conceptual mechanics of “original intent”—whose intent 
mattered, how it should be identified, what mental states 
counted as “intent,” and so forth. They also neglected to 
offer any account of originalism’s normative underpinnings 
besides a vague promise of “judicial constraint.”21 These and 
 
 17. This account is a cynical version of the much-more-charitable (or sympathetic) 
history offered in Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 13–27. I don’t intend to present 
this account as fact. But I think it is a plausible interpretation of fact, and so, in presenting the 
Cynical Narrative, I will cite actual sources that might be used to support such an interpretation. 
 18. Classic uses of originalism in this conservative-critical vein include the sources cited 
supra note 10, as well as BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 11. 
 19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court held that married couples have a 
constitutional right to use contraceptives, thus setting the stage for later “right of privacy” 
decisions including Roe. 
 20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court in Miranda applied the Fifth Amendment to hold that 
confessions by criminal defendants can be admitted as evidence only if certain warnings were 
administered prior to interrogation. 
 21. See Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 12, at 863–64; BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra 
note 11, at 4–5. The “judicial constraint” rationale is of course not original with modern 
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other shortcomings made the “Old Originalism” a relatively 
easy target for the counterattacks that came from the (mostly 
liberal) legal academy in the late 1970s and into the 1980s.22 
During the same period, however, conservatives were gaining 
more power in national politics and thus, eventually, among 
the judiciary, including on the Supreme Court. Ronald 
Reagan’s election in 1980 brought a new, conservative Chief 
Justice, William Rehnquist, and the appointment as 
Associate Justice of Antonin Scalia, who would become a 
flagbearer of originalism. From 1980 through 2010, seven of 
the eleven new Justices were appointed by Republican 
presidents. These Justices had an incentive to develop 
originalism as an apparently principled ground for 
overturning liberal Burger Court, Warren Court, and perhaps 
even New Deal precedents. They were aided and abetted in 
this endeavor by the formation in 1982 of the Federalist 
Society,23 an organization of conservative law professors and 
students that lent academic credibility and intellectual 
firepower to the effort to rehabilitate originalism. 
The result was the “New Originalism”—a better-theorized 
attempt to patch the holes in the old version.24 New 
 
originalists. Chief Justice Taney famously used it in his infamous opinion in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, the 1857 decision holding that slaves, former slaves, and their descendants could never 
be citizens of the United States and that Congress lacked power to prohibit slavery in the 
territories: 
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or 
impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-
making power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution. 
The duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with the best 
lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its 
true intent and meaning when it was adopted. 
60 U.S. 393, 405 (1857). 
 22. Among the most important early examples are Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for 
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981), reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33–71 
(1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, MATTER OF PRINCIPLE]; and H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1985). 
 23. See ORIGINALISM, supra note 10, at 1 (citing 1982 as the date the Federalist Society was 
formed). The Originalism book is a collection of reprinted speeches by leading lights of 
contemporary originalism, combined with the transcripts of panel discussions held to celebrate 
the Society’s 25th anniversary in 2007. 
 24. “New Originalism” and “New Originalists” are terms sometimes used to describe a 
loosely defined school of theory that has arisen during the past generation or so and that is 
largely responsible for the move away from “original intention” originalism and toward its 
“original public meaning” iteration. See, e.g., Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 18–
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Originalists replaced the problematic quest for “original 
intent” with the seemingly more concrete notion of “original 
public meaning.”25 And they began to devise deeper 
normative theories to support originalist methodology.26 
They held conferences, wrote books and articles, and earned 
chairs and named professorships at elite law schools. Most 
importantly, their work began to bear the fruit of significant 
results on the Court, such as 2008’s District of Columbia v. 
Heller, an originalist-to-the-bone decision that recognized for 
the first time an individual right to bear arms under the 
Second Amendment.27 
But the New Originalism, like the Old, remains a stratagem 
for imposing politically conservative values in the guise of 
constitutional interpretation. Nowhere is this more evident 
than in what New Originalist Randy Barnett has called 
originalism’s “special difficulty with precedent.”28 
Originalism is no different from any other methodology in 
the conflict it presents with existing Court decisions that it 
concludes are wrongly decided. Yet originalists tend to 
 
19. Although I will use these labels as convenient shorthand in this Article, I do so somewhat 
reluctantly, as they remind me of the following exchange from the movie This Is Spinal Tap: 
Marty: Let’s . . . talk a little bit about the history of the group. I understand, Nigel, 
you and David originally started the band . . . was it . . . back in 1964? 
David: Well, before that we were in different groups. I was in a group called The 
Creatures . . . which was a skiffle group. 
Nigel: I was in Lovely Lads. 
David: Yeah. 
Nigel: And then we looked at each other and says well, we might as well join up, you 
know, and uh . . . . 
David: So we became The Originals. 
Nigel: Right. 
David: And we had to change our name actually . . . . 
Nigel: Well, there was . . . another group in the East End called The Originals, and 
we had to rename ourselves. 
David: The New Originals. 
Nigel: The New Originals. And then, uh, they became . . . . 
David: The Regulars. They changed their name back to The Regulars, and we thought, 
well, we could go back to The Originals, but what’s the point? 
THIS IS SPINAL TAP (MGM 1984). 
 25. See sources cited supra note 11; see also Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 
18–19. 
 26. See Solum, Originalism, supra note 9. 
 27. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 28. Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 6, at 262. 
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obsess about stare decisis.29 This is because originalism is 
caught between the Scylla of its true raison d’être—as a 
device for overturning liberal precedents—and the Charybdis 
of those few nonoriginalist precedents (e.g., Brown v. Board of 
Education)30 with which even originalists cannot bear to part. 
(No surprise, then, that many originalist theorists conclude 
that Brown should not be overturned while insisting, almost 
in the same breath, that Roe must be.)31 
Originalism, in short, is a cynically instrumentalist 
philosophy. It reflects not a good-faith attempt to derive the 
actual meaning of the Constitution, but rather a politically 
motivated effort to overturn liberal results and impose 
conservative ones. 
 
 29. Examples of ink spilled, and lecture halls filled, by originalists on the topic of stare 
decisis include the following. Ink spilled: Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 6; Kurt T. Lash, 
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007); Gary 
Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994); Gary 
Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007); 
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 803 (2009) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism]; Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2731–34 
(2003); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the 
Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419 (2006). Lecture halls filled: Panel on Originalism and 
Precedent, in ORIGINALISM, supra note 10, at 199–252. 
 30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court explicitly rejected originalist methodology 
in invalidating mandated racial segregation in public schools under the Equal Protection Clause. 
 31. To my knowledge, the first originalist to argue that Brown was in fact correctly 
decided—that racial segregation was in fact contrary to original meaning or original intent—was 
Michael McConnell. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 947 (1995). McConnell’s arguments swim upstream against a strong consensus of 
historical and legal scholarly opinion. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 10, at 117–33; Alfred Avins, De 
Facto and De Jure School Segregation: Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment from the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, 38 MISS. L.J. 179 (1967); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and 
the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Michael Klarman, An Interpretative History of 
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 (1991); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, 
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 
(1995). Nonetheless, his conclusion has been endorsed in a number of subsequent originalist 
writings, always without independent historical analysis. See Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra 
note 6, at 260; McGinnis & Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism, supra note 29, at 842–43. 
Even originalists who reject McConnell’s conclusion that Brown was rightly decided as an 
originalist matter (or who suspend judgment on that conclusion) often conclude for other 
reasons that it should not be overturned. See, e.g., Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 6; 
McGinnis & Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism, supra note 29, at 837–41; Lash, supra note 29, at 
1469–71; Strang, supra note 29, at 480–82. Many of these same originalists insist that Roe should 
be overruled. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism, supra note 29, at 840–41; Lash, 
supra note 29, at 1469–71; Strang, supra note 29, at 482–84. 
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Having read this Cynical Narrative, imagine that you are a 
committed originalist. (Perhaps in fact you are one.) Would you be 
(are you) offended by the Narrative? Would you (do you) find 
something insulting, perhaps even threatening, in its implications? 
Would you be (are you) motivated to refute it as best you could 
(can)? 
Now suppose that the Cynical Narrative turns out to be true. So 
what? Would its truth be grounds to doubt originalism if you are an 
originalist? To criticize it if you are not? 
The fact is that few if any originalists accept, much less promote, 
the Cynical Narrative. Few originalists defend their approach as a 
way to implement politically conservative (or any other particular 
kind of) results. But in many, perhaps most, cases, the results 
originalists claim for their methodology coincide with results that 
political conservatives would approve (or at least would find more 
palatable than the alternatives). Most originalists claim Roe was 
wrongly decided; most political conservatives disapprove of an 
abortion right. Many people in this country consider themselves 
political conservatives; politicians appeal openly to their views as a 
matter of course. Why then have originalists not used the attainment 
of conservative results as an explicit justification for their 
methodology? 
The most likely intuitive reaction to the Cynical Narrative, I 
believe, is that it is borderline defamatory if false and deeply 
problematic for originalism (perhaps even disqualifying of it) if true. 
Intuitively, there is something very wrong with staking one’s 
preferred approach to constitutional interpretation entirely on the 
achievement of certain politically controversial outcomes. 
I think this intuition is correct, and that the implications of its 
correctness are important. To explain why, I begin with a rare and 
refreshing exception to the rule: a thoughtful originalist who does in 
fact defend his approach as a way to implement politically 
conservative—to be completely accurate, politically libertarian—
results. I’m referring to Randy Barnett. 
C. Barnett’s Libertarian Constitutional Theory 
Barnett defends originalism as an implication of his account of 
constitutional authority. “The Constitution . . . is a piece of 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014 11:13 AM 
1251 What Lies Beneath 
 1267 
parchment under glass in Washington, D.C.,” he notes.32 “Why 
should we pay any attention to it?”33 Barnett agrees that, as I will 
argue in Part IV, this question cannot satisfactorily be answered with 
the notion that we have consented to be bound by the Constitution.34 
Instead, he contends, legitimate constitutional authority ultimately 
depends on whether the system of laws established by the 
Constitution is substantively just, or at least “not unjust.”35 And he 
asserts that justice consists of certain “natural rights” that protect 
liberty.36 “[I]f a constitution contains adequate procedures to 
protect these natural rights, it can be legitimate,” he says.37 
As it happens, Barnett argues, the Framers also believed in these 
libertarian natural rights and “incorporated effective procedural 
protections of these rights into the Constitution.”38 The 
Constitution as created by the Framers, then, is legitimately 
authoritative, according to Barnett; it is authoritative because 
obeying it will promote the libertarian rights it was designed to 
protect. And so to determine the meaning of that Constitution, we 
ought to be bound by what it was that the Framers actually created. 
This requires interpreting the Constitution, in the first instance, by 
looking for “the meaning [its words] had at the time they were 
enacted.”39 
 
 32. BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 9. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. at 11–31. 
 35. Id. at 9; see id. at 32–52. 
 36. See id. at 53–86. 
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. Id. at 53; see id. at 53–86. 
 39. Id. at 90; see id. at 89–117. “In the first instance,” because Barnett recognizes that 
there will be no identifiable, determinate original meaning with respect to many constitutional 
questions. See id. at 118–21. Where a determinate original meaning cannot be identified, Barnett 
supports constitutional “construction”: the judicial creation of a constitutional meaning “that is 
consistent with its original meaning but not deducible from it.” Id. at 121; see id. at 118–30. I 
discuss this “interpretation”/“construction” distinction in Part III.A, below. 
I should note here that Barnett’s leap from the premise that the Constitution is legitimate 
because it protects natural rights to the conclusion that the Constitution must be interpreted 
according to its original meaning is too hasty, for at least two reasons. First, the (legitimate) 
Constitution created by the Framers might contemplate nonoriginalist interpretation. The use of 
vague terms like “freedom of speech” and “due process of law,” for example, might be 
delegations to subsequent interpreters to define constitutional meaning by evolving standards 
rather than according to original meaning. Second, if it is the protection of natural rights that 
gives the Constitution its legitimacy, then the best method of interpretation is the one that best 
protects natural rights—even if doing so requires departing from original meaning in some 
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Barnett’s approach thus presents originalism as an entailment of 
an account of constitutional authority—as an implication of the 
reason why the Constitution binds us in the first place. And Barnett 
justifies constitutional authority as a means of promoting particular 
substantive values, in the form of libertarian “natural rights.” 
For our purposes here, there are two interesting features of 
Barnett’s account. One is its suggestion that we need to explain 
constitutional authority before we can understand constitutional 
methodology. The second is the particular explanation of 
constitutional authority he offers—an explanation grounded in the 
pursuit of certain (undoubtedly controversial) outcomes or values. In 
exploring why this second feature of Barnett’s account is flawed, we 
can begin to see why the first feature must be correct. 
D. Values Imposition, Content-Independence, and Authority 
The problem with Barnett’s account of constitutional authority is 
that it is not really an account of constitutional authority at all. It can 
neither justify nor motivate obedience to the Constitution. 
The concept of authority is among the most elusive in legal 
philosophy.40 For present purposes, we can define authority as 
follows: 
Authority is the capacity to impose a moral obligation of obedience to 
whatever agent or norm possesses it. 
If constitutional law possesses authority, then those subject to it 
(legislators, executive-branch officials, citizens, judges) have, for that 
reason, a moral obligation to obey it. If constitutional law lacks 
authority, those subject to it may have reason to obey it—the fear of 
sanctions for disobedience, for example—but they lack a moral 
obligation of obedience. 
There are three key operative distinctions underlying the concept 
of authority. The first is between authority and mere coercion. If we 
attribute real authority to law, we recognize an obligation to obey it 
 
instances (where, for example, the Framers’ understanding of natural rights was defective). 
We can put these objections to one side for present purposes, however. The important 
points here are, first, that Barnett’s defense of originalism derives from his account of 
constitutional authority, and second, that Barnett’s account of constitutional authority hinges on 
certain substantive outcomes or values (“natural rights”). 
 40. For a thorough exploration of its problematics, see Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382 (Jules Coleman & Scott 
Shapiro eds., 2002). 
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even absent a meaningful threat of sanctions for disobedience. As 
H.L.A. Hart observed, our attitude toward valid legal commands 
differs from our attitude toward the orders of an armed gunman.41 
We view the former as authoritative, as legitimately binding, and 
thus as imposing an obligation to obey even without the teeth of 
sanctions. We view the latter as illegitimate and thus as merely 
coercive, not authoritative. 
The second key distinction is between the kind of obligation 
imposed by authoritative law on the one hand, and a garden-variety 
reason to act on the other. If we recognize a law as valid, we treat it as 
more than just another factor relevant to our process of deciding 
how to act. The facts that it is dark and rainy outside are reasons to 
drive slowly; the fact that the law sets a speed limit imposes an 
obligation to drive slowly. While it is implausible that this obligation 
is absolute and indefeasible,42 it must at least have greater 
normative force than most other relevant reasons for action. 
A closely related third distinction, and the one most relevant for 
present purposes, is between a reason or obligation to act that is 
content-dependent and one that is content-independent.43 A content-
dependent reason is a reason to attribute a certain moral status to an 
action—to conclude, for example, that the action is morally 
obligatory on the one hand or morally prohibited on the other. The 
facts that it is dark and rainy outside are content-dependent reasons 
to drive slowly; they are reasons to attribute a certain moral status 
(moral desirability, perhaps even moral necessity) to the act of 
driving slowly. A content-independent reason, in contrast, is a 
reason to take or refrain from a certain action regardless of one’s 
beliefs about the moral status of that action. The fact that the law 
imposes a speed limit is a content-independent reason to drive 
slowly; it is a reason to take that action without regard to whether 
we believe the action is morally desirable or morally necessary. 
As this example suggests, legal authority requires content-
independence. The obligation to act that the law imposes on us must 
be independent of the moral status we attribute to that action; the 
law must be capable of obligating us to take actions we (otherwise 
 
 41. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82–91 (2d ed. 1994). 
 42. On this point, see CHRISTOPHER J. PETERS, A MATTER OF DISPUTE: MORALITY, 
DEMOCRACY, AND LAW 33–36, 44–47 (2011). 
 43. For a reasonably clear explanation of content-independence, see Shapiro, supra note 
40, at 389. 
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would) think morally incorrect or suboptimal or wrong,—that is, 
actions we otherwise would conclude we should not take. If we have 
an obligation to obey the law only when it tells us to do the morally 
right thing, then the supposed authority of the law is illusory: our 
obligation is to obey the requirements of morality, not those of the 
law. Only if we have an obligation to obey the law even when it is 
wrong—even when it requires us to do something other than what 
morality dictates—does the law really possess authority over us. 
This requirement of content-independence may seem rather 
abstract, but it has real-world significance for the effectiveness of 
law. To see how, imagine that the Constitution tells us to do 
something other than what we think morality requires. Perhaps, for 
example, it commands us to afford due process to a terrorism 
suspect, even though we think national security creates a moral 
imperative to imprison the suspect without trial. If our obligation to 
obey the Constitution depends entirely on the moral status of its 
content—of what it is telling us to do—then we will recognize no 
obligation of obedience in this case, or in any case in which we 
disagree with the Constitution’s requirements. We will simply do 
what we think morally best in such cases, and the Constitution will 
fail to function as law. 
A Constitution that fails to motivate obedience in cases of 
disagreement with its commands would be a disaster. This is 
particularly true because constitutional law is less susceptible than 
ordinary law to obedience through coercion. Legal subjects might 
often obey sub-constitutional norms simply to avoid the 
consequences of being caught disobeying them. (I need not 
recognize the legitimate authority of the tax code in order to fear 
criminal prosecution for tax avoidance.) In the constitutional 
context, however, it very often is unrealistic to think that 
disobedient subjects will be punished for their disobedience. The 
contested nature of many constitutional norms frequently makes it 
difficult to say with any confidence whether someone has obeyed 
them or not. Enforcement mechanisms, moreover, are clumsy: in the 
United States, constitutional disobedience by government officials 
typically can be “punished” only by the blunt instrument of voting 
them out at the next election or by the extreme and rare measure of 
impeachment and removal from office. And the entity that is the 
ultimate subject of the Constitution’s constraints—the democratic 
majority itself—is immune even to these sanctions. 
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Effective constitutional law therefore depends largely on people’s 
willingness to obey it in circumstances in which they disagree with 
its commands but face no meaningful threat of sanctions for 
disobedience. Indeed, we can think of a constitution as an attempt to 
coordinate behavior in the face of disagreement. The people subject 
to constitutional law will of course disagree on matters of substance: 
on whether terrorism suspects deserve due process, whether 
reproductive freedom deserves protection, whether Congress should 
mandate the purchase of health insurance, and so on. The purpose of 
constitutional law is to resolve, or at least to manage, these 
substantive disagreements so that we can function with reasonable 
coordination as a society. Constitutional law can succeed in this 
function only if those subject to it will accept and obey its results—
even when they disagree with them in substance. Constitutional law, 
then, must provide reasons to obey its results that are not dependent 
on their substance. As Jeremy Waldron puts it, “the point is as old as 
Hobbes”: 
We must set up a decision-procedure whose operation will settle, 
not reignite, the controversies whose existence called for a 
decision-procedure in the first place. This means that even though 
the members of . . . society . . . disagree about [matters of 
substance], they need to share a theory of legitimacy for the 
decision-procedure that is to settle their disagreements. So, in 
thinking about the reasons for setting up such a procedure, we 
should think about reasons that can be subscribed to by people on 
both sides of any one of these disagreements.44 
We can now begin to see why Barnett’s theory fails as an account 
of the authority of the Constitution. Barnett grounds constitutional 
authority—our obligation to obey the Constitution’s commands—in 
the desirability of certain substantive results or values (his list of 
libertarian “natural rights”). On the relatively abstract level of 
morality, such a theory cannot support the obligation of obedience it 
promises. One’s obligation, on Barnett’s theory, is to obey natural 
rights, not the Constitution itself. One then should do as the 
Constitution commands only insofar as this will foster the protection 
of these natural rights. If obeying the Constitution fails to protect 
natural rights, one has no obligation (on Barnett’s account) to obey it. 
 
 44. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1371 
(2006) [hereinafter Waldron, Core] (citations omitted). 
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On a more practical, sociological level, Barnett’s theory cannot 
motivate obedience to constitutional law. If one agrees with 
Barnett’s list of natural rights, then one has a reason to do as the 
Constitution commands whenever doing so would promote those 
rights. But if one disagrees with the rights on Barnett’s list, or with 
the entire concept of natural rights; or if one agrees with Barnett’s 
list of rights but disagrees, in any given case, that obeying the 
Constitution would promote them; then one will perceive no 
obligation to obey the Constitution. Barnett’s approach provides no 
reason to obey that, in Waldron’s words, “can be subscribed to by 
people on both sides” of a disagreement about natural rights. And 
thus it fails to justify constitutional law as “a decision-procedure 
whose operation will settle, not reignite, the controversies whose 
existence called for a decision-procedure in the first place.”45 
Barnett’s theory therefore is, in essence, a deeply theorized, 
entirely noncynical version of the Cynical Narrative. It defends 
originalism, ultimately, on the ground that originalism promotes 
certain libertarian values or outcomes, values that the proponent 
endorses but that inevitably will be controversial among a broader 
audience. If promoting Barnett’s libertarian values is the only reason 
to obey an originalist Constitution, then someone who disagrees 
with those preferred values has no reason for obedience. Such a 
person will—must—either reject Barnett’s originalism or reject the 
authority of the Constitution altogether. 
Barnett thus offers us an example—rare in its honesty46—of 
what I will call a Values Imposition account of constitutional authority. 
Such an account attempts to ground the authority of the 
Constitution in its supposed capacity to promote particular 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Rare, but not quite unique. Political philosopher Hadley Arkes, like Barnett, 
interprets the Constitution as the embodiment of certain libertarian-leaning natural rights. See 
HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (1990); HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE 
SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994). Unlike Barnett, however, 
Arkes does not directly address the question of the Constitution’s authority, and unlike Barnett, 
Arkes is not an originalist: he advocates direct resort to natural-law principles in constitutional 
adjudication. Other accounts that might be read to ground originalism in Values Imposition are 
those of Richard Kay; see Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 16 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998); and Lee Strang, see Strang, supra 
note 29. Kay, at least, joins Barnett in adopting a relatively libertarian understanding of the 
values the Constitution is designed to implement; Strang is less committal on this point, 
identifying the Constitution with what he terms the “Aristotelian tradition” of pursuing “the 
common good.” See Strang, supra note 29, at 437-41. 
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substantive values or results. As I’ve argued, the attempt inevitably 
fails because it is content-dependent, not content-independent. 
Values Imposition accounts attribute authority, not to the 
Constitution itself, but to the desired values or results. In so doing, 
these accounts fail to motivate obedience by those who disagree with 
the values or results in question. 
III. INTERPRETATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY? 
Barnett grounds his theory of interpretative methodology in a 
theory of constitutional authority; his theory of authority fails, and 
therefore his theory of methodology does too. This suggests that a 
theory of interpretation needs a theory of authority, but it does not 
prove it. Perhaps the centrality of authority to interpretation is an 
unusual property of Barnett’s particular theory. 
Much of the remainder of this Article is devoted to 
demonstrating, directly or obliquely, that Barnett’s theory is 
representative rather than unique in this regard; a good theory of 
authority really is necessary for a good theory of interpretive 
methodology. In Parts IV through VI, I make this case indirectly, by 
examining accounts of constitutional authority and explaining how 
they entail certain approaches to constitutional interpretation. In 
this Part, however, I make the case directly. I begin with a relatively 
practical argument that interpretive methodology must at least be 
consistent with some account of constitutional authority. I then 
address the possibility, suggested by Lawrence Solum, that an 
approach to constitutional interpretation can be developed without 
resort to theories of authority or other normative arguments. 
First, however, I need to resolve a potential ambiguity in what I 
mean by “constitutional interpretation.” 
A. “Interpretation” vs. “Construction” 
My use of the term “constitutional interpretation” might be 
thought to beg a fairly important question. Many New Originalists, 
including Barnett, distinguish between the acts of constitutional 
“interpretation” and constitutional “construction.”47 Larry Solum 
defines constitutional interpretation as “the activity directed at 
 
 47. See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 118–30; Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010); Solum, Semantic 
Originalism, supra note 8, at 67–87; WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 195–212. 
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discerning the semantic content of the constitutional text” and 
constitutional construction as “the activity directed at resolving 
vagueness, ambiguity, gaps, and contradictions [in the text] and at 
constitutional implicature.”48 So understood, constitutional 
“interpretation” is limited to the project of determining what the 
words of the constitutional text mean, and constitutional 
“construction” is the additional project of determining how to apply 
the text to a particular issue or dispute where the application is not 
evident from the meaning of the words. As Solum puts it, 
“[c]onstitutional construction begins when the meaning discovered 
by constitutional interpretation runs out.”49 
Here is what I think is a straightforward example of the 
interpretation-construction distinction. Article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution gives Congress the power to “make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the 
powers of the federal government that are expressly enumerated in 
the document.50 “Interpretation” would be the project of 
determining what concept or concepts the phrase “necessary and 
proper” signifies. For example, does “necessary” include only those 
means that are absolutely essential to the execution of some 
enumerated power? Or, as John Marshall famously concluded in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, does it have a more capacious meaning, 
“import[ing] no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or 
essential to another”?51 Answering this sort of question is the 
province of “interpretation” as that term is used by Solum and 
others. 
Suppose we “interpret” the word “necessary” (putting aside the 
question of which technique we use to do this) in accordance with 
Marshall’s broader definition. On the New Originalist 
understanding, the additional project of “construction” remains. We 
still have to “construe” the word “necessary,” so interpreted, to 
determine how it applies to the particular case at hand—to 
determine whether a particular measure taken by Congress (say, the 
incorporation of a national bank) qualifies as “necessary” within that 
word’s meaning. This additional task of “construction” is required 
 
 48. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 67. 
 49. Id. at 69. 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 51. 17 U.S. 316, 413 (1819). 
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because the word “necessary” by itself—even though we understand 
its meaning—does not resolve the particular issue we must decide. 
In this Article, I mean the term “constitutional interpretation” to 
include both “interpretation” and “construction” in the New 
Originalist senses. I will use the following definition of 
“constitutional interpretation” going forward: 
Constitutional interpretation is the process of determining whether and 
how the Constitution applies to an issue or dispute. 
A court trying to resolve the McCulloch issue of whether Congress 
has the power to charter a Bank of the United States would have to 
determine both what Solum calls the “semantic meaning” of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause (the New Originalists’ 
“interpretation”), and whether chartering a bank is consistent with 
that meaning (the New Originalists’ “construction”). I lump both 
these tasks together under the label “interpretation.” I do so in part 
because I believe this more-general sense of the concept 
“interpretation” is consistent with how lawyers, and indeed the 
general public, typically use the term; they do not usually draw the 
interpretation/construction distinction, helpful though that 
distinction may be in certain contexts. More fundamentally, I lump 
these tasks together because I think an account of constitutional 
authority is necessary to adequately theorize both of them, as I 
contend in the next two sections. 
B. The Practical Necessity of Authority 
So, must an account of constitutional interpretation (defined 
broadly as above) ultimately be grounded in some account of why 
the Constitution is authoritative in the first place? 
As a conceptual matter, I think the answer is no; but as a 
practical matter, the answer is yes. One way in which the normative 
grounding of an interpretive methodology might be disconnected 
from the normative grounding of the law being interpreted is if that 
law has no normative grounding—if it lacks legitimate authority 
altogether. Imagine, for example, a theory of the least-offensive way 
to interpret the illegitimate diktats of an all-powerful despot. Where 
the law is illegitimate but also unchangeable and unavoidable, the 
best we can do might be to come up with the least-harmful way to 
interpret and apply that illegitimate law. We might then say that the 
interpretive methodology is normatively legitimate even though the 
law being interpreted is not. 
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But it seems unlikely that the interpretation of our Constitution 
fits this model. This is not (merely) because the Constitution seems 
more legitimate than the commands of a despot. It is due, rather, to 
the fact that we could, if we (as a society) chose, replace the 
Constitution through means that are peaceful and democratic, even 
if they happen to be technically illegal (though they need not be). 
The Framers, after all, substituted the Constitution for the Articles 
of Confederation in this way.52 Even if the Constitution is not 
legitimate, its illegitimacy therefore is avoidable. And it would be 
difficult to justify pursuing the least harmful method for interpreting 
the Constitution if we thought the Constitution itself was 
illegitimate and thus not worth interpreting. If we thought the 
Constitution was illegitimate, the normatively justifiable thing to do 
would be to replace it altogether, not to attempt triage by devising a 
relatively inoffensive way to interpret it. 
Thus it would make little sense to theorize about the legitimate 
interpretation of an illegitimate Constitution. As a practical matter, 
we must believe the Constitution itself is legitimately authoritative 
before considering how best to interpret it. But is it possible that our 
reasons for thinking the Constitution is legitimate can be entirely 
independent of our reasons for preferring one or the other method of 
interpreting it? 
I very much doubt it. Suppose we believe, as Barnett does, that 
the Constitution is legitimately authoritative because obeying it 
tends to protect certain libertarian natural rights. It would then 
make little sense to discern the meaning of the Constitution in a way 
that is not designed to further this purpose. The likely result of 
doing so would be to apply the Constitution in many situations in 
which its authority is not justified. 
 
 52. The possibilities of replacing the Constitution through peaceful democratic means are 
not limited to those delineated by Article V of the Constitution itself, which provides for 
amendments according to certain procedures. We might, using non-Article V democratic 
procedures, decide to discard the Constitution and (using non-Article V democratic procedures) 
draft and ratify an entirely new one. This is precisely what the Framers did with respect to the 
Articles of Confederation. Article XIII of the Articles required the approval of Congress and the 
unanimous approval of each of the state legislatures for amendments. The procedure specified in 
Article VII of the new Constitution proposed by the Convention of 1787, however, contemplated 
ratification by special conventions (not the legislatures) in nine of the thirteen existing states 
(not unanimously), and it did not require the approval of Congress. This is in fact the procedure 
that was followed, albeit with the eventual endorsement of the Confederation Congress. See 1 
MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 121 (3d ed. 2011). 
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For example, suppose we adopt Barnett’s natural-rights 
grounding of constitutional authority; but suppose we then choose a 
method of interpreting the Constitution that has a different 
grounding altogether (say, that it is the best way to constrain 
judges). It will only be happenstance that these diverse rationales—
protecting natural rights and constraining judges—converge to 
produce the same result in any particular case. In some cases, 
perhaps in many, the goal of constraining judges will conflict with 
the goal of protecting natural rights. A constrained judge, for 
instance, might fail to strike down a piece of legislation that impairs 
a natural right the Constitution was designed to protect. It would 
make much better sense to tailor our interpretive methodology to 
our reason for having and obeying the Constitution in the first place. 
Here is a somewhat more theoretical way to make the relevant 
point, with a debt to the work of Ronald Dworkin. Constitutional 
law is a conscious human practice with moral implications. We as a 
society have (and to some extent each of us as individuals has) a 
choice whether to engage in it or not, and our choice to engage in it 
implies a determination that the practice is morally worthwhile on 
the whole. In determining how the practice operates—how best to 
interpret the Constitution’s commands, for instance—we ought to 
consider the practice in its morally best light and perform it in a way 
that is consistent with this moral vision.53 Constitutional law 
purports to bind us in important ways, and if it is a morally 
justifiable practice, that binding authority has a justifiable moral 
grounding. The way we perform a core aspect of the practice—
interpreting the Constitution, that is, determining how it binds us in 
particular instances—therefore should reflect, indeed promote, that 
moral grounding. Constitutional interpretation should further 
constitutional authority. 
This is not to say that every feature of a practice like 
constitutional law must be justifiable by reference to the moral 
grounding of the practice as a whole. Some features of a practice 
might serve to effect side constraints rather than to promote the 
underlying purpose of the practice. Consider the rule in ice hockey 
requiring players to wear helmets. Wearing helmets probably cannot 
be justified by reference to the overall purposes of the practice of ice 
 
 53. This is essentially Dworkin’s understanding of the project of “interpretation” writ 
large. See his lengthy discussion in RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986). 
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hockey (athletic competition, entertainment, physical exercise). 
Some even think wearing helmets impedes some of these goals. The 
helmet rule, rather, is justified by the side constraint of preventing 
serious injury while playing hockey. 
There may be aspects of the American practice of constitutional 
law that resemble the helmet rule in ice hockey in this respect, 
though I am at a loss to identify one. In any event, interpretive 
methodology almost certainly does not qualify. How we interpret the 
Constitution is far too central to our practice of constitutional law 
itself to be justifiable solely or primarily by reference to a side 
constraint. Constitutional interpretation is our means of determining 
how constitutional law binds us, and binding us is simply what 
constitutional law does. It seems impossible to understand how the 
Constitution binds without also understanding why it does so. 
It would then be difficult to justify an interpretive approach 
designed to identify the meaning of an unjustifiable Constitution, or 
to identify its meaning without reference to the reason the 
Constitution is justifiable. To put the matter concisely: a persuasive 
answer to the question of interpretive methodology should follow 
from a persuasive answer to the question of constitutional authority. 
C. Interpretation Without Tears? Solum’s “Semantic” Approach to 
Interpretation 
In his provocative essay “Semantic Originalism,” New Originalist 
theorist Lawrence Solum suggests that significant portions of a 
theory of constitutional interpretation can be assembled without 
resort to accounts of authority or other deeply normative arguments. 
Solum describes and defends a core conception of originalism that 
consists of four basic assertions, or theses. The “Fixation Thesis” 
holds that “the meaning of constitutional provisions is fixed at the 
time of ratification.”54 The “Clause Meaning Thesis” holds (with a 
number of clarifications and qualifications) that the meaning of 
constitutional provisions is determined by their original public 
meaning.55 The “Contribution Thesis” holds that the meaning of the 
Constitution (so defined) contributes to—that is, becomes part of—
the content of the law.56 The “Fidelity Thesis” holds that we are 
 
 54. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 3; see id. at 2–4, 59–67. 
 55. See id. at 5, 38–58. 
 56. See id. at 6–8, 134–49. Solum subsequently has reformulated the Contribution Thesis 
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obligated to obey the Constitution (absent some overriding moral 
reason to the contrary) because it is part of the supreme law of the 
land.57 Together these theses add up to roughly the following 
statement of originalism: we are obligated to obey the original public 
meaning of the Constitution. 
What is most interesting in Solum’s arguments for present 
purposes is his belief that most of (his definition of) originalism—
the Fixation Thesis, the Clause Meaning Thesis, and the 
Contribution Thesis—can be defended purely as a descriptive matter, 
that is, purely as statements of fact about our linguistic and legal 
cultures, without the need to rely upon normative arguments.58 
Solum believes that the meaning of the Constitution just is its 
original public meaning at the time of ratification and that this 
meaning just is part of our law. He acknowledges that he may be 
wrong about how to identify constitutional meaning and whether it 
is part of our law, but he insists that whether he is wrong is a 
question purely of fact, not of normative evaluation. The questions 
of what the Constitution means, he contends, and of whether and 
how it contributes to our law, are in essence empirical questions, 
like the questions of when the Constitution was ratified or of the 
chemical composition of the parchment it was printed on.59 
 
as the “constraint principle”: “the idea that the communicative content of the constitution . . . 
should constrain the legal content of constitutional doctrine and thereby should also constrain 
the way officials behave.” Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of 
Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 155 (2012) [hereinafter Solum, Faith and Fidelity]. 
I don’t believe this reformulation is material to my treatment of Solum’s approach in this 
Article. 
 57. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 8–9, 149–60. 
 58. Solum acknowledges that the Fidelity Thesis, holding that the Constitution must be 
obeyed, relies on normative arguments. See id. at 8 (“[T]he [Fidelity] [T]hesis is based on moral 
premises: it is a claim about political obligation and civic virtue.”); see generally id. at 8–9, 149–
60. 
 59. See id. at 8: 
The first three theses [Fixation, Clause Meaning, and Contribution] share an 
important characteristic: they all make factual claims that do not rely on moral 
premises. The fixation thesis and the clause meaning thesis make claims about the 
semantic content of the Constitution: as a matter of fact, the meaning of a given 
constitutional provision is fixed at the time of origin by its original public meaning. 
The contribution thesis makes a claim about the legal significance of the constitutions 
[sic] semantic content: as a matter of fact, the semantic content makes some 
contribution to American law. These factual claims are not based on arguments of 
political morality. The semantic content of the Constitution of 1789 was fixed at that 
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I am deeply skeptical of these assertions (which is not the same 
as saying I can refute them decisively). The extent to which we care 
about the semantic meaning (or “communicative content”60) of the 
constitutional text, I believe, depends on whether, and why, we 
think constitutional law is justified in the first place, and these 
questions inevitably will be matters of normative argument 
For example, I might believe that constitutional law is justified 
because (and to the extent that) it provides relatively transparent 
and determinate rules that can help us avoid costly political disputes 
over important issues—a “rule of law” rationale that flows from 
what I call in Part VI a Dispute Resolution account of constitutional 
authority.61 If this is my belief about the justification of 
constitutional authority, then it follows that I will want interpreters 
to look for (and be bound by) the semantic meaning of the text only 
insofar as it furthers this justification—that is, only insofar as it 
helps provide relatively transparent and determinate rules. If the 
search for semantic meaning does not regularly generate these kinds 
of rules (as in fact seems rather likely, given the historiographic and 
conceptual challenges of identifying original public meaning), I 
might then want interpreters to look elsewhere for the content of 
constitutional law—perhaps to (more-accessible) modern-day 
meanings, or perhaps to relatively specific court decisions of 
constitutional issues. 
On the other hand, I might believe that constitutional law is 
justified because the process that created the constitutional text—
the Framing—is especially reliable as a way of generating good moral 
rules or principles. (This would be a version of the Moral Guidance 
account of authority I discuss in Part V.)62 If so, then I will want 
 
time because of the way that communication through language works, and not 
because it is a good idea to interpret the Constitution that way. 
Id. at 8. The bulk of Solum’s argument that the Fixation and Clause Meaning Theses are 
implications of purely descriptive semantic theory can be found in id. at 27–126. The bulk of his 
argument that the Contribution Thesis is an implication of purely descriptive legal positivism 
can be found in id. at 139–43. 
 60. In Semantic Originalism, Solum uses the terms “semantic meaning” and “linguistic 
meaning” to describe the content of the Constitution that he believes is fixed at the time of 
ratification and contributes to the law in some meaningful way. See id., passim. In later work, 
Solum often uses the term “communicative content” in place of these terms. See, e.g., Solum, 
Faith and Fidelity, supra note 56, at 154–55. 
 61. See infra Part VI.H. 
 62. See infra Part V.A–B. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014 11:13 AM 
1251 What Lies Beneath 
 1281 
interpreters to look for (and be bound by) the rules or principles that 
were in fact generated by the Framing process, which would seem to 
entail a search for the semantic meaning of the text, even if that 
meaning typically is not particularly transparent or determinate. 
Whether and how much we care about the semantic meaning of 
the constitutional text, then, will depend on our normative purposes 
for practicing constitutional law (for interpreting it, implementing it, 
enforcing it, obeying it, and so on); it will depend on our 
(normatively driven) theory of constitutional authority. If this is 
right, then it refutes Solum’s assertion that the Contribution Thesis 
is purely a matter of descriptive truth and not at all susceptible to 
normative argument. And while I am less confident that Solum’s 
Fixation and Clause Meaning Theses rely similarly on normative 
premises, note that those theses become less relevant to the extent 
one rejects or waters down the Contribution Thesis. If the semantic 
meaning of the constitutional text contributes little or nothing to the 
content of constitutional law, then when and how that meaning is 
fixed becomes a matter of mostly academic concern. 
Solum’s arguments deserve a more robust evaluation than this, 
but that task will have to await another forum. For the purposes of 
the present Article, whether Solum is right or wrong about the non-
normativity of “Semantic Originalism” is mostly beside the point. 
This is because Solum’s conclusion applies only to the process he 
calls “interpretation”—the process of identifying the meaning of the 
text—and not at all to the process of “construction,” of applying the 
text to resolve an issue where, as in most cases, the meaning of the 
text does not resolve that issue by itself. 
1. Normative judgments in construction  
Suppose Solum is correct that the meaning of the Constitution 
just is its public meaning at the time of ratification, and that this 
meaning just is part of our law. (This sums up the implications of his 
Fixation, Clause Meaning, and Contribution Theses.) Much work 
remains to be done to determine how the Constitution applies to 
particular issues and disputes, even with its meaning and its status 
as law determined. There is, first of all, the process that Solum and 
other New Originalists call “construction,” which, as I noted in Part 
III.A, is what happens “when the meaning discovered by 
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constitutional interpretation runs out.”63 Constitutional text is 
endemically vague; many of its provisions “admit of borderline (or 
uncertain) applications,” in Solum’s phrase.64 A few of many 
examples are the terms “legislative Powers,” “executive Power,” and 
“judicial Power” in Articles I, II, and III, respectively;65 the grant of 
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States” in Article I, section 8;66 and the guarantees of “the 
freedom of speech” in the First Amendment,67 “due process of law” 
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,68 and “the equal 
protection of the laws” in the Fourteenth Amendment.69 
Constitutional text also sometimes is ambiguous, as with the word 
“necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause.70 Solum identifies 
the additional possibilities that the text will have gaps or 
contradictions and that it will have implied content.71 
In short, the meaning of the constitutional text is frequently, 
indeed systemically, underdeterminate. In order to apply that 
underdeterminate text to the resolution of a particular issue, an 
interpreter (what I suppose Solum would call a “construer”) will 
have to make normative choices. She will have to decide on a general 
approach to construction—construe the Constitution in the way that 
promotes justice? Construe it the way the Framers would have 
done?—which decision inevitably will reflect normative judgments.72 
And, depending on which approach she chooses—”construe so as to 
promote justice,” for example—she may have to make additional 
normative judgments in applying that approach. 
My conclusion in this Article—that a theory of constitutional 
interpretation, broadly understood,73 must rest on a normative 
account of constitutional authority—would hold true for this 
 
 63. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 69. 
 64. Id. at 70. 
 65. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 1, cl. 1; art. III, § 1. 
 66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 67. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 68. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; amend. XIV, § 1. 
 69. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 71. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 73–75. 
 72. Solum describes the various approaches to construction offered by contemporary 
originalists in id. at 76–79. 
 73. Broadly understood to include what Solum and other New Originalists call 
“construction.” See supra Part III.A. 
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important and usually necessary process of construction, even if it 
does not hold true for the process of identifying the meaning of the 
constitutional text. 
2. Other necessary normative judgments  
My conclusion also would apply to other aspects of 
interpretation writ large. (Remember that I am defining 
“interpretation” fairly capaciously: as the process of determining whether 
and how the Constitution applies to an issue or dispute.74) Consider Solum’s 
Contribution Thesis, which holds that the Constitution’s original 
meaning contributes in some way to the content of our law but 
which does not specify how it contributes.75 An interpreter often 
(perhaps usually) will have to answer this “how” question in order 
to apply the Constitution in a particular case. 
Suppose, for example, that an originalist judge in 1954 
determines that the original meaning of the phrase “deny[ing] . . . 
the equal protection of the laws”76 in the Fourteenth Amendment is 
vague with respect to the question of enforced racial segregation in 
public schools—that is, that school segregation is neither clearly 
consistent nor clearly inconsistent with the original meaning of the 
Clause. The judge then must decide the implications of this 
indeterminacy—whether it ends the matter or simply opens the door 
to the further process of construction. 
It would not be ridiculous for the judge to elect the former 
alternative—to conclude that, because the Constitution’s text does 
not determine the issue, there simply is no constitutional rule 
governing school segregation (and thus segregation is left to be 
governed by sub-constitutional laws). Such a conclusion would be 
consistent with Solum’s Contribution Thesis: the judge would be 
acknowledging that the Constitution’s meaning contributes to the 
content of the law. But he would be making the further judgment 
that this contribution is limited to cases in which the Constitution’s 
meaning is determinate. And that judgment may be, perhaps 
inevitably will be, a normative one. For example, the judge may 
justify his position as an implication of what I will call in Part V a 
 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 6 (“The contribution thesis itself 
does not answer questions about the strength or structure of that contribution.”). 
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Moral Guidance account of constitutional authority: he might believe 
that constitutional commands should be obeyed because, and only to 
the extent that, they represent a trustworthy moral judgment of the 
Framers or of the people who ratified the document. The absence of 
a determinate textual resolution of the segregation issue might 
signal, for the judge, the absence of a relevant judgment of the 
Framers or the ratifiers that must be obeyed—and thus the absence 
of binding constitutional law. 
Or suppose the judge identifies a determinate original meaning 
but is faced with precedent that, if followed, would mandate a result 
inconsistent with that meaning. Even assuming the judge accepts the 
Contribution Thesis, he will have to decide whether the 
Constitution’s original meaning trumps the precedent or vice-versa. 
He will have to decide, that is, how to prioritize different sources of 
law (original meaning and precedent) when they conflict. And this 
decision too invites moral judgments. 
So there is plenty of room for normative arguments and 
judgments in constitutional interpretation, even if Solum is right 
that a significant part of interpretation is non-normative. Solum puts 
it this way: “[T]he meaning of the written [C]onstitution”—the part 
Solum thinks can be identified non-normatively—“is important 
enough to make for a substantial mouthful even if it isn’t the whole 
enchilada.”77 I would add that it usually takes quite a few more bites 
to finish the enchilada. 
IV. AUTHORITY BY CONSENT 
If I am right that a theory of constitutional interpretation 
requires a theory of constitutional authority, the next questions 
become: What are the plausible theories of authority? And what 
interpretive methods do they support? 
I have been able to identify three potentially plausible ways to 
justify constitutional authority, each of which has been relied upon 
in some form to support originalist interpretation. This Part 
introduces, and critiques, the first such account, one based on 
consent. The problem with what I will call a Consent account, simply 
put, is that meaningful consent to be governed by the Constitution is 
not, and probably could not be, a widespread fact in modern society.  
 
 
 77. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 28 n.109. 
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Most of us have not consented to constitutional law in a way that 
can justify its authority over us. 
A. The Normative Force of Consent 
Recall that a Values Imposition account of constitutional 
authority, like Randy Barnett’s, fails because it cannot provide a 
content-independent reason to obey the Constitution.78 Those who 
agree with the preferred set of values do not need the Constitution 
to tell them how to act. Those who disagree with those values have 
no reason to obey the Constitution as a way to implement them. 
Consent, however, might provide a content-independent reason 
for obedience. Our consent is an exercise of our autonomy; by 
consenting to something, we are asserting our capacity to plan our 
own lives. As the legal and political philosopher Joseph Raz writes: 
There is some normative force to the fact that one gives one’s free 
and informed consent to an arrangement affecting oneself . . . . 
Consent, whether wise or foolish, expresses the will of the agent 
concerning the conduct of his own life. Whatever mess results from 
his consent is, in part at least, of his own making. Since his life is 
his own, it is relevant whether it is under his control or not, and 
consent shows that it is.79 
In order for consent to be effective as a means of planning or 
“controlling” one’s own life, that consent must cause some actual 
change in the conditions of that life. My consent to something must 
actually obligate me somehow, or at least create a strong moral 
reason for me to act consistently with my consent; otherwise my 
consent would be ineffectual as an expression of my autonomy. And 
note that the power of consent to impose moral obligations (or 
create moral reasons) can apply even when what we are consenting 
to is in essence a loss of control, in the form of the subjugation of our 
own judgment or wishes to those of others. If I agree to allow my 
spouse to choose the paint color in our kitchen, for example, I am 
consenting to be bound by her decision, even if I disagree with it in 
substance. Indeed, by consenting to marry my spouse, I have agreed 
to stay with her through richer or poorer, in sickness and in health, 
 
 78. See supra Part II.D. 
 79. Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 162–63 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998). 
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etc., even if I later decide I would prefer not to. By purchasing a 
home subject to a covenant that allows a homeowner’s association to 
make rules governing various issues, from the color of our siding to 
the content of our garden to the amount of the maintenance fees we 
must pay, my spouse and I have consented to be bound by those 
rules, even if we think them burdensome or unwise. And so on. 
As these examples suggest, the reason, perhaps the obligation, 
created by the act of giving consent is a content-independent one: it 
does not depend on the pre-existing moral status of what one has 
consented to, or on one’s own views about that moral status. If I 
have consented to be governed by the decisions of a homeowner’s 
association, I then have a reason, perhaps an obligation, to abide by 
those decisions, even if (a) I think those decisions are incorrect as a 
moral matter and (b) those decisions are in fact incorrect as a moral 
matter. My consent has in effect altered my moral universe, such 
that actions I would not have been required to take—perhaps even 
actions I would have been morally forbidden to take—prior to my 
consent are now, thanks to that consent, actions that I must take (or 
at least have a strong reason to take). 
B. Consent as Popular Sovereignty 
If an individual can create a self-imposed moral obligation by 
giving her consent, then perhaps a collection of individuals—a 
“people”—can create a collectively self-imposed moral obligation by 
consenting to be governed by a certain person or entity or process. 
Suppose we start with the premise that “the people” are sovereign—
entitled to rule themselves—in a sense analogous to how the 
individual is autonomous (entitled to rule herself). “The people” 
then would be capable of exercising their sovereignty by consenting 
to be governed in a certain way—even if that form of government 
alienates some of that “people’s” existing capacity to decide things 
for themselves. Consent to be ruled would be an exercise of popular 
sovereignty, even if what is being consented to is not a completely 
“popular” form of government. 
This basic idea of popular sovereignty as consent to government 
goes back, of course, at least to Hobbes,80 and runs forward through 
 
 80. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 227–28 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (describing the 
formation of a commonwealth as an act of unanimous consent). Keith Whittington traces the 
notion even farther back, to the writings of the French philosopher Jean Bodin. See 
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Locke81 and Rousseau82 to the American Founders. The Declaration 
of Independence declared that “Governments . . . deriv[e] their 
just powers from the consent of the governed,” and Alexander 
Hamilton leveraged the notion of consent into a theory of 
constitutional authority: 
[T]he power of the people is superior to both [the judicial and the 
legislative power], and . . . where the will of the legislature, 
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, 
declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by 
the latter rather than the former. . . . 
. . . . 
 . . . [T]hough I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution 
will never concur with its enemies in questioning that fundamental 
principle of republican government which admits the right of the 
people to alter or abolish the established Constitution whenever 
they find it inconsistent with their happiness . . . . Until the 
people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or 
changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves 
collectively, as well as individually . . . .83 
Note that Hamilton holds the Constitution superior, not just to 
the legislature (which he earlier calls the “agents” of the people84), 
but also to “the people” themselves. Having engaged in the “solemn 
and authoritative act” of consenting to the Constitution, the people 
cannot later “alter or abolish” that Constitution simply because they 
“find it inconsistent with their happiness.” They can do so only by 
means of another “solemn and authoritative act.” 
Hamilton’s account thus can be read as a Consent account of 
constitutional authority: it justifies the binding nature of the 
 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 113–16 (citing generally JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH (M.J. Tooley ed. & trans., 1955)). 
 81. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305, 367–68 
(Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (describing the creation of “civil society” as an act of unanimous 
consent). 
 82. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 16–27 (Willmoore Kendall trans., 
1954) (describing the formation of a unanimous “original agreement” to transfer the private 
rights of individuals to a sovereign). 
 83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 439–40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) 
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78]. 
 84. Id. at 439. Hamilton’s logic on this point was cribbed by John Marshall in Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–78 (1803). 
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Constitution as a function of “the people’s” sovereign act of 
consenting to its rule. The people gave their consent to the 
Constitution; the people now have a moral obligation to obey the 
Constitution, whether they agree with its commands (whether they 
“find it [c]onsistent with their happiness”) or not. 
We might recognize the threads of Hamilton’s nascent account 
in contemporary theorist Bruce Ackerman’s influential narrative of 
“dualist democracy.”85 Ackerman distinguishes between “normal 
politics”—everyday, typically self-interested decision-making 
through the mechanisms of representative democracy—and “higher 
lawmaking”—the creation of “supreme law in the name of the 
People.”86 Ackerman’s “higher lawmaking” is supreme because it 
occurs on behalf of “the People,” not just those who govern the 
People or some subset of the People. The constitutional law that 
emerges from higher lawmaking therefore, in Ackerman’s view, is 
binding on normal politics going forward (and must be enforced, and 
periodically “synthesized” with earlier acts of higher lawmaking, by 
the Supreme Court).87 
C. Consent and Originalism 
Originalists sometimes ground their methodology in the 
normative force of consent, and it is not hard to see the connection. 
Suppose Hamilton and Ackerman are right that the Constitution was 
an act of popular sovereignty—of consent by “the people” (or “the 
People,” with Ackerman’s capital “P”)—and that it therefore is 
supreme over the products of “normal politics.” Suppose, in other 
words, that the Constitution is “the instrument by which the 
consent of the governed—the fundamental requirement of any 
legitimate government—is transformed into a government . . . .”88 
How do we know what it was that the People consented to? 
 
 85. The canonical statement of Ackerman’s theory appears in BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
 86. Id. at 6. Ackerman describes the basic distinction in id. at 6–7. He elucidates each 
concept at much greater length in id. at 230-65 (“normal politics”) and id. at 266–94 (“higher 
lawmaking”). 
 87. On the “preservationist” function of the Court, see id. at 9–10, 60–61, 72; on its 
function of “synthesis,” see id. at 86–99, 113–30, 140–62. 
 88. These words belong to Edwin Meese, Ronald Reagan’s second Attorney General and 
an influential catalyst of the burgeoning originalist movement in the 1980s. Edwin Meese III, 
The Law of the Constitution (Speech at Tulane University) (Oct. 21, 1986), reprinted in 
ORIGINALISM, supra note 10, at 99, 102. 
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The obvious answer is to determine what the actual people 
(small “p”) who did the actual consenting—those who participated 
in ratifying the Constitution and its subsequent amendments—
would have understood the text of the Constitution to mean. 
Consent theory thus appears to imply originalist interpretation, most 
likely in its “original public meaning” variant. As originalist theorist 
Keith Whittington writes, “originalism . . . enforces the 
authoritative decision of the people acting as sovereign.”89 
I should note that the popular sovereignty/originalism 
connection is not as inevitable as this quick statement of originalist 
logic suggests.90 If an individual can consent to surrender her 
judgment to another, then a “People” might consent to surrender its 
judgment to another—perhaps to a subsequent iteration of “the 
People,” perhaps even to constitutional judges. This raises the 
possibility that what the People consented to when they authorized 
the Constitution was in fact a nonoriginalist Constitution—a 
Constitution that could be interpreted by subsequent decision-
makers in a way that goes beyond, perhaps even is inconsistent with, 
the original People’s understanding of its meaning.91 In short, the 
original understanding might have contemplated nonoriginalist 
interpretation. If so, then subsequent interpreters would be violating 
the principle of popular sovereignty rather than upholding it by 
pursuing originalist methods.92 
I won’t linger on this objection, however, because I want to focus 
on two more-foundational problems with the Consent account. First, 
the notion that “the People” during the crucial Framing periods 
actually gave meaningful consent to the Constitution is problematic. 
Second, whether or not “the People” in 1788 or 1791 or 1868 
consented to the Constitution is, in an important sense, irrelevant, 
because those “People” are not us. 
 
 89. WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 111. To the same effect, see Lash, supra note 29. 
 90. Whittington, for his part, is well aware of the nuances of and potential objections to 
any attempt to ground originalism in popular sovereignty. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 
111–13 (acknowledging that the connection has been “underdeveloped” in originalist thought 
and posing several important questions to be resolved); id. at 113–59 (addressing these 
questions). 
 91. This is, I think, a fair summary of Ackerman’s actual position on constitutional 
interpretation. In any event, Ackerman clearly is not an originalist. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra 
note 85, at 131–62 (describing the Court’s interpretive function on a dualist theory). 
 92. This is the possibility argued for (with a focus on original intent rather than original 
public meaning) in Powell, supra note 22. 
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D. The Nonunanimous Framing(s) 
We can start with the observation that the first three words of 
the Constitution, “We the People,” are a fiction.93 Even in 1789, 
when the original Constitution took effect by its own terms, the 
electorate eligible to participate in the ratification process was only a 
subset of “the People” as a whole, that is, of the population that 
would be bound by the document. Slaves of course could not vote;94 
neither could women in any state,95 or those without property in 
many states,96 or free blacks in some.97 And even among those who 
could participate in the ratification process, approval of the new 
Constitution was far from unanimous.98 A substantial percentage of 
the American people at the time of the Framing therefore cannot be 
said to have consented to the Constitution in any affirmative sense. 
The same problems afflict each of the Constitution’s 
amendments, though to a lesser extent as we move forward in time. 
Racial restrictions on the franchise actually increased between the 
Founding and the Civil War,99 such that in 1868, when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, free blacks could vote in only 
eight of the thirty-three states.100 Most property requirements had 
disappeared by then,101 but women still could not vote in any 
 
 93. I owe this admittedly provocative but quite accurate phrasing to Randy Barnett. See 
BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 14. 
 94. “[N]o [state or federal] regime either before or after the Revolution ever gave the 
vote to slaves . . . .” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 19 (2005). 
 95. See id. The minor exception was New Jersey, which “apparently did allow a few 
propertied widows to vote.” Id. 
 96. Eleven of the thirteen states required ownership of property in order to vote at the 
time they ratified the Constitution. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE 
CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 327–28 (2000) (Table A.1). Akhil 
Amar notes, however, that eight of these states suspended or liberalized their property 
requirements for purposes of electing delegates to their ratifying conventions. See AMAR, supra 
note 94, at 7. 
 97. Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia barred free blacks from voting at the time of 
ratification. See KEYSSAR, supra note 96, at 327–28 (Table A.1). 
 98. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 52, at 121–28 (describing the contentious 
ratification process). 
 99. See KEYSSAR, supra note 96, at 53–60. 
 100. They were Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, 
Vermont, and Rhode Island. See id. at 87–88, 89. In New York, moreover, only propertied free 
blacks could vote. See id. at 87–88. 
 101. See id. at 351–55 (Table A.9) (showing only three states—New York, Rhode Island, 
and South Carolina—with property requirements as of 1855, one of which (New York) applied 
its requirement only to free blacks, the other of which (Rhode Island) applied it only to non-
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state.102 The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, moreover, 
were in essence forced upon the recently rebellious southern states: 
the former through ratification by provisional Reconstruction 
legislatures,103 and the latter by the coercive device of making 
ratification a condition of readmission to the Union.104 Many 
citizens, too, opposed ratification, as many had several generations 
earlier at the original Framing. With the enactment of the Fifteenth 
Amendment (prohibiting denial of the vote based on race), and then 
the Nineteenth (sex), the Twenty-Fourth (failure to pay a poll tax), 
and the Twenty-Sixth (age if at least eighteen), the most egregious 
exclusions have been eliminated over time. Certainly, however, no 
amendment has ever been ratified with the unanimous consent of 
the citizenry alive at that moment. 
Can “the People” consent to a constitution in a way that binds 
dissenters? If consent is the mechanism doing the binding, it is hard 
to see how. A citizen who dissents from the Constitution has not 
somehow exercised her own autonomy by virtue of the fact that 
some other citizens (even a large majority of other citizens) voted for 
it. The result has been imposed upon her, not invited by her. 
Perhaps we can claim that “the People” as a collective body has 
consented to something by virtue of a majority or super-majority of 
its components having consented to it. But this maneuver seems 
more rhetorical than real. The Constitution, after all, purports to 
bind citizens (and others) not just collectively, but in their individual 
capacities as well. It is true that our Constitution, with the exception 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, directly limits only actions taken by 
government, not those performed by private actors. But I cannot 
insist that the government take some action that I favor on the 
ground that I oppose the constitutional provision that forbids it. My 
ability as a citizen to use my vote and my power of political speech to 
create a legal regime I favor is limited by constitutional constraints 
on the content of that legal regime. I cannot somehow exempt 
myself from the Constitution merely because I failed to consent to it. 
So it appears that consent cannot explain the authority of the 
Constitution, even with respect to all of those alive during the 
 
native citizens). 
 102. See id. at 172–83. 
 103. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 52, at 476. 
 104. See id. at 502–04. 
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relevant framing periods. And this difficulty is likely to be endemic 
to any modern constitution, not just our own. Not every constitution 
suffers from the grievous exclusion of slaves and women at its 
framing. But any constitution framed to govern a large polity in the 
diverse conditions of a modern democracy will have its dissenters. By 
itself, the notion of consent cannot justify binding such people. 
E. The Dead-Hand Problem 
The nonunanimity problem with Consent accounts is 
compounded by what is sometimes called the “dead hand” problem: 
the chronological distance between our own time and the crucial 
Framing periods. No American alive today was alive when the 
original Constitution was ratified in 1788, or when the Bill of Rights 
was added in 1791, or when the Reconstruction Amendments were 
added between 1865 and 1870; so none of us could have given our 
consent to those actions when they occurred. Even a (counterfactual) 
act of unanimous consent to the Constitution by the relevant 
Framing generation therefore cannot bind us on the theory that we 
have consented. “We the People” is really “they the People”; the 
Constitution was their act of popular sovereignty, not ours. 
Just to be clear, note that the objection here is not to the 
Hamiltonian idea that “the People” might choose to bind themselves 
going forward. Prospective self-binding, after all, is what consent is 
all about. The objection is to the notion that “the People” who did 
the consenting in 1788 (or 1791 or 1868) is the same “People” that 
the Constitution purports to bind today. What is problematic about 
the Hamiltonian account is not the notion of self-binding that it 
endorses, but rather the tenuous conception of the “self” that it 
assumes. 
Note too that we cannot dodge this difficulty by pointing to the 
possibility of amending the Constitution using the procedures 
specified in Article V. That possibility can’t overcome our lack of 
consent any more than using those procedures, or failing to use 
them, can demonstrate our consent. We have not, after all, 
consented to Article V as the exclusive means to amend the 
Constitution, or to the principle that amending it (rather than 
simply ignoring it) is our only option if, in Hamilton’s phrase, we 
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now “find it inconsistent with [our] happiness.”105 To derive 
consent from Article V is to engage in bootstrapping.106 
Nor is the problem solved by the fact that some living Americans 
have expressly consented to be bound by the Constitution. 
Naturalized citizens do so when they take their citizenship oaths, 
and government officials are required by Article VI to swear or affirm 
that they will “support this Constitution.”107 But this is a very small 
percentage of the citizenry. The vast majority of the people have not 
given express consent to the Constitution’s authority. 
There are a few more-sophisticated attempts to resolve the dead-
hand problem, but none of them turns out to be very satisfying. 
There is the notion that we have given our tacit consent to the 
Constitution by living within the polity it supposedly governs. There 
is the device of constructive or hypothetical consent, which holds that 
we would or should have consented and therefore can be deemed to 
have done so. And there is the idea of what Keith Whittington calls 
“potential sovereignty”—the argument that we must recognize the 
Constitution as binding so that we in turn may use constitutional 
law to bind others. I address each in turn. 
F. Tacit “Consent” 
Some theorists have argued that the act of continuing to live 
within a regime amounts to a person’s tacit consent to be bound by 
that regime. Rousseau, for example, attributed consent to be bound 
by law to the act of “resid[ing] within the state after its . . . 
establishment.”108 Locke similarly found consent in the “Possession, 
or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of . . . 
government.”109 
 
 105. Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 139–40. 
 106. On this point, see Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and 
Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1404–05 (2009). 
 107. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. On its most natural reading, the oath required by Article 
VI compels officials only to support the Constitution while carrying out their official duties, not 
to obey it in other capacities. And keep in mind that if an official has no duty to obey the 
Constitution generally, she has no duty to obey Article VI’s oath requirement in particular. It is 
at least debatable whether an official who has taken the required oath, believing that she is 
under no obligation to obey the Constitution, would be subject to such an obligation by virtue of 
having taken the oath. 
 108. ROUSSEAU, supra note 82, at 168. 
 109. LOCKE, supra note 81, at 392. 
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But these theories are unconvincing because they suppose a 
choice that, for most people, does not exist. Most of us cannot 
simply pack up and leave our homes, our families, and our jobs to 
emigrate elsewhere; the costs of doing so would be prohibitive, or at 
least considerably higher than the costs of living under a 
Constitution to which we would not consent if given a meaningful 
choice. And where would we go if we could leave? Except perhaps 
for billionaires who can purchase remote private islands, most of us 
could move only to other extant societies with their own existing 
systems of government, which may or may not be preferable on the 
whole to the one we are considering leaving. Valid consent requires 
the option to withhold consent, to say “no”;110 but for very few (if 
any) of us is this a realistic alternative. Tacit consent is not real 
consent.111 
G. Constructive “Consent” 
Tacit consent is an attempt to deploy the mechanics of consent 
where actual consent is lacking. A similar maneuver is the idea of 
constructive (or hypothetical) consent, which holds that we should be 
treated as having consented to something if, presented with certain 
ideally fair decision-making conditions, we would have consented to 
it. The paradigmatic constructive-consent theory is John Rawls’s 
device of a hypothetical “original position” from which equally 
situated individuals would choose the central features of an ideal 
political system.112 Can we say the Constitution is binding because 
we would have consented to it if given the opportunity to do so in 
something like Rawls’s original position? 
The answer is either “no” or “kind of.” If the suggestion is that 
constructive consent can substitute for actual consent, the answer is 
no. Actual consent has normative force because it is an exercise of a 
person’s autonomy, her capacity to make her own decisions, 
 
 110. See BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 16 (“[F]or consent to have any 
meaning, it must be possible to say, ‘I do not consent’ instead of ‘I consent.’”). Barnett presents 
an extensive, and mostly persuasive, argument against the notion that the Constitution binds us 
because we have consented to it. See id. at 11–31. 
 111. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 130–31 (arguing against the validity of tacit 
consent). 
 112. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–22 (1971). A similar idea is presented in 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW 
AND DEMOCRACY 107, 447–50 (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
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whatever those decisions may be. As Raz aptly puts it, “[c]onsent, 
whether wise or foolish, expresses the will of the agent concerning 
the conduct of his own life. Whatever mess results from his consent 
is, in part at least, of his own making.”113 The normativity of actual 
consent flows from the very possibility of using it unwisely. We 
would hardly be autonomous if we were always required to make 
good decisions. 
Constructive consent is entirely different. The point of the 
constructive-consent device is not to allow the individual to accept 
moral obligations in a way that furthers her autonomy, but rather to 
identify the kinds of decisions the individual would make if certain 
obstacles to rational decision-making were removed. Its point, in 
other words, is to identify good decisions. Perhaps we can say that a 
person is bound in some way by the decisions she would have made 
under conditions of hypothetical consent, by virtue of the fact that 
they are (or rather would be) good decisions. But we cannot say she 
is bound because she actually consented to those decisions. She did 
not actually consent to them. Actual consent, again, supposes the 
possibility of bad decisions—of consent given foolishly.114 
So constructive consent cannot bring whatever obligations come 
from actual consent. This is not to say that the device of constructive 
consent cannot contribute in some way to the recognition of 
authority or of some other kind of obligation. By helping us identify 
good answers to certain kinds of questions, constructive consent 
might lead us to a satisfactory account of constitutional authority. 
Constructive consent asks us, in essence, to imagine the political 
system to which we would consent if freed from the real-world 
baggage of unequal bargaining power and knowledge of how our 
decisions will affect our own selfish interests. It is possible that we 
would determine that such a system includes an authoritative 
constitution, perhaps even one much like our own. (In this sense, 
constructive consent might “kind of” make the Constitution 
binding.) But constructive consent in this vein is merely a heuristic 
technique, a way of revealing some worthwhile account of authority 
 
 113. Raz, supra note 79, at 162–63. 
 114. On the failure of constructive or hypothetical consent to create obligations, see Raz, 
supra note 79, at 162–63 (“[E]ven if real consent is a source of authority, it is far from clear that 
hypothetical consent is. I know of no argument which shows that it is.”); see also PETERS, supra 
note 42, at 52–57 (presenting an expanded version of the argument against authority by 
constructive consent). 
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that, because it is worthwhile, can stand on its own merits. The 
authority of the Constitution would exist by virtue of this stand-
alone account identified using constructive consent, not by virtue of 
constructive consent itself.115 
H. “Potential Sovereignty” 
Keith Whittington, a New Originalist theorist, makes the 
intriguing suggestion that the Constitution has authority, not 
because it reflects any actual exercise of popular sovereignty, but 
because it makes possible our potential exercise of popular 
sovereignty.116 The Constitution, Whittington writes, 
is not binding in a strong sense. We have not vested it with 
authority. Rather, it is binding in a weaker, but still sufficient 
sense, in that it represents our potential to govern ourselves. By 
accepting the authority of the Constitution, we accept our own 
authority to remake it. The existing Constitution is a placeholder 
for our own future expression of popular sovereignty.117 
If I understand Whittington, he is claiming that we ought to 
obey the Constitution, not because we are bound by anything the 
long-dead “People” of the late-eighteenth or mid-nineteenth 
centuries did, but rather because obeying it now gives us standing to 
impose constitutional law on future generations later. To put this 
claim negatively, we cannot purport to assert sovereignty over future 
generations if we refuse to recognize the sovereignty of the Framing 
generation over us. So we ought to do the latter to preserve our 
ability to do the former. 
This argument is interestingly original, but it is not convincing. 
There is no reason to think that our recognizing the (otherwise 
nonexistent) authority of a prior generation over us somehow gives 
us a claim to assert (otherwise nonexistent) authority over 
subsequent generations. Suppose, for example, that we (the current 
generation of Americans) follow this rationale and agree to accede to 
the otherwise nonbinding constitutional commands of our 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century predecessors. And suppose we 
then attempt to express our own popular sovereignty by amending 
 
 115. On this point, see PETERS, supra note 42, at 53–57. 
 116. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 127–52. 
 117. Id. at 133. 
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the Constitution to bind future generations, or perhaps even 
“remaking” it altogether as Whittington suggests. What moral 
obligation can this impose on those future generations? They cannot 
be bound by our consent to the existing Constitution, any more than 
they can be bound by our act of consenting to a new constitution. 
What we consent to is our business; what they consent to is theirs. 
We the People are not they the People. 
If our consent can’t bind future generations, Whittington’s 
rationale for giving that consent disappears. The dead-hand problem 
reemerges unresolved, and the idea of “government by consent” 
becomes simply loose talk. Consent cannot underwrite the authority 
of the Constitution, and so it cannot underwrite originalism or any 
other methodology for interpreting it. 
V. AUTHORITY BY MORAL GUIDANCE 
So far we have ruled out two accounts of constitutional authority 
that might be thought to justify originalism, for two different 
reasons. Values Imposition accounts are not really accounts of 
authority at all, because they provide no content-independent reason 
to obey the Constitution. Consent accounts might provide such a 
reason, but they are descriptively implausible under the conditions 
that obtain in the United States or, most likely, in any other modern 
democracy. 
This section explores a third alternative, one that is less 
immediately recognizable than Consent but probably more prevalent 
and, as it turns out, considerably more nuanced. The account is less 
recognizable because those who employ or endorse it often do so 
implicitly and rarely acknowledge the common thread tying their 
views to the seemingly dissimilar views of others. I will refer to this 
justification of constitutional authority as a Moral Guidance account. 
A. The Normative Force of Moral Guidance 
According to a Moral Guidance account, the authority of 
constitutional law rests in the comparatively superior moral wisdom 
of the process (or processes) that created it. Our reason to obey 
constitutional commands is not that we have consented to them, or 
that they will generate particular results we prefer (as on a Values 
Imposition account), but rather that obeying the Constitution is 
more likely to lead us to good results than is ordinary democratic 
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politics—whatever those good results might be and however their 
goodness might be assessed. 
As we saw from the failure of Values Imposition accounts, 
constitutional authority cannot be built on the desire to achieve 
particular (controversial) values or other outcomes. One way of 
stating the reason why is to note that those who disagree with the 
values or outcomes in question would recognize no reason to 
acknowledge the Constitution’s authority. But as Jeremy Waldron 
points out, we might be able to attribute authority to procedures we 
think are likely to generate good outcomes, even if we can’t agree 
ahead of time on what those outcomes are: 
Instead of saying (in a question-begging way) that we should 
choose those political procedures that are most likely to yield a 
particular controversial set of rights [or moral values or other 
outcomes], we might say instead that we should choose political 
procedures that are most likely to get at the truth about rights [or 
values, or outcomes, etc.], whatever that truth turns out to be.118 
If we can agree that constitutional procedures are, generally 
speaking, more likely to generate morally good outcomes (with 
respect to certain matters, at least) than are ordinary democratic 
procedures, we might then attribute authority to constitutional law 
even if we disagree with some of the particular results it produces. A 
useful analogy is the policy of subjecting children to their parents’ 
control until they turn eighteen. We may not agree with every 
decision a given parent makes, but we think parents are, as a general 
matter, more likely to make good decisions regarding the child’s 
welfare than is the child herself (or, for that matter, other potential 
decision-makers, such as the state). So we generally cede decision-
making authority to parents, knowing that we will not agree with 
how they exercise that authority in every instance. 
Grounding constitutional authority in the general capacity for 
moral guidance, not in particular moral values or outcomes, can skirt 
the content-dependence problem that dooms Values Imposition 
accounts. Of course, Moral Guidance accounts cannot provide a 
reason to obey constitutional commands one knows to be morally 
erroneous; they cannot provide a reason to do the wrong thing. But 
they can leverage the ubiquitous fact of uncertainty about morality to 
 
 118. Waldron, Core, supra note 44, at 1573–74. 
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create a reason to obey commands one thinks are erroneous. The 
premise of Moral Guidance accounts is that the constitutional 
process is more likely to generate morally good outcomes than the 
alternatives. If one accepts this premise, then one has a reason to 
obey even a constitutional outcome with which one disagrees. That 
reason is that the constitutional process is more likely to have gotten 
it right, morally speaking, than the alternative decision-making 
procedures—including the exercise of one’s own judgment. 
This reason for obedience stems from one’s own uncertainty 
about what morality requires, and from one’s willingness to defer to 
the constitutional process in cases of uncertainty. Again, parental 
authority is a good analogy: even if we disagree with a particular 
decision a parent makes about her child, our general confidence in 
the comparative superiority of parental decision-making gives us 
reason to defer to that decision anyway. 
Some influential constitutional theories attribute—or can be read 
to attribute—this sort of Moral Guidance authority to the act (or 
acts) of constitutional Framing. Consider again the views expressed 
by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78, which we explored in 
discussing Consent in the previous Part. Hamilton asserted that the 
“solemn and authoritative act” of creating a constitution was 
superior to whatever might result from the “ill humors” and 
“momentary inclination[s]” of ordinary politics.119 Viewed as a 
Consent theory, Hamilton’s hierarchy is unconvincing, at least 
insofar as it contemplates imposing constitutional law on 
subsequent (nonconsenting) generations. In the alternative, 
however, we might read Hamilton’s hierarchy as the expression of a 
Moral Guidance account of constitutional authority. Hamilton might 
be claiming authority for constitutional law, not on the ground that 
“the people” consented to the Constitution, but rather on the theory 
that something special about the “solemn . . . act” of 
constitutional lawmaking—its deliberativeness, perhaps, or its 
broadly participatory scope—renders that process more reliable as a 
source of moral wisdom than the flighty procedures of everyday 
politics, with its “ill humors” and “momentary inclination[s].”120 
Or consider Bruce Ackerman’s “dualist democracy.” Perhaps the 
normative force of Ackerman’s “higher lawmaking” flows, not from 
 
 119. Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 440. 
 120. Id. 
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the mere fact that “the People” have consented to it, but from the 
way in which they consented: by means of an extraordinarily 
deliberative and participatory process that occurred over an extended 
period of time and garnered the acquiescence of a diverse assortment 
of viewpoints and interests. Our reason for treating constitutional 
law as higher law, on this Moral Guidance version of Ackerman’s 
theory, is our confidence in the relative wisdom of this process—our 
belief that constitutional lawmaking is more likely to get things 
right, morally speaking, than is normal democratic politics. 
A Moral Guidance justification of originalism might deflect the 
content-dependence problem of a Values Imposition account, as I’ve 
explained. And Moral Guidance seems more plausible than a 
Consent account, at least as an initial matter, because it does not 
depend on the problematic notion that most or all Americans today 
have somehow consented to be bound by what the Framers decided 
generations ago. Moral Guidance accounts depend, rather, on our 
acceptance of the process of constitutional Framing as a procedure 
that is “most likely to get at the truth” about rights or other moral 
matters, in Waldron’s phrase.121 
B. Moral Guidance and Originalism 
It is not difficult to see how this type of Moral Guidance account 
might underwrite originalism. If our reason for obeying the 
Constitution stems from the special moral wisdom of the Framing or 
ratification process, then we ought to identify those judgments 
actually made by the Framers (or approved by the ratifiers) and apply 
them, so far as we can, to current problems. It is the Framers’ or the 
ratifiers’ judgments that contain the comparative moral wisdom that 
justifies obedience; the further away we move from actual judgments 
of the Framers or ratifiers, the more attenuated our reason for 
obeying the Constitution becomes. Nonoriginalist constitutional law 
therefore is not (authoritative) law at all; it has no claim to our 
obedience. If we want constitutional law to be law, we have to 
interpret and apply it using an originalist methodology. 
And in fact some originalists expressly ground their 
methodology in Moral Guidance accounts. The most prominent 
example is the work of John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport,122 
 
 121. Waldron, Core, supra note 44, at 1374. 
 122. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism, supra note 29; John O. McGinnis & 
Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693 (2010) [hereinafter 
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who argue that requirements of super-majoritarian approval, like 
those used to adopt the original Constitution and those that apply to 
subsequent amendments, tend to produce rules that are conducive to 
the public good. This is so, McGinnis and Rappaport contend, 
because super-majoritarian requirements necessitate broad 
consensus123 and, given the difficulty of amending the rules they 
generate, impose a sort of Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” that 
discourages narrowly self-interested rule-making.124 Obtaining the 
benefits of the super-majoritarian procedures of the Framing 
requires implementing rules actually approved by those 
procedures—that is, it requires originalist methodology.125 
C. Framing-focused and Court-focused Accounts 
At the risk of complicating my terminology, I will refer to the 
type of Moral Guidance account described to this point—one that 
locates special moral wisdom in the process (or processes) of 
Framing and/or ratifying the Constitution or its amendments—as a 
Framing-focused account. I do this to distinguish it from another 
prevalent variant of Moral Guidance, which we might call a Court-
focused account. 
Some theorists can be read to ascribe special moral wisdom—not 
to the Framing, but rather to the process of subsequent 
constitutional adjudication. (Not coincidentally, these theorists 
usually are concerned with justifying judicial review in particular, 
not constitutional law more generally.) Hamilton wore this hat as 
well. In Federalist No. 78, he argued that “the independence of the 
 
McGinnis & Rappaport, Good Constitution]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A 
Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383 (2007) [hereinafter McGinnis & 
Rappaport, Pragmatic Defense]. 
 123. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Good Constitution, supra note 122, at 1704–06, 1710–19. 
 124. See id. at 1706–10. 
 125. See id. at 1733–53. Note that the particulars of the Framing-focused Moral Guidance 
account in question seem likely to determine the type of originalist methodology that should be 
used. If we attribute the special moral wisdom of the Framing to characteristics of the overall 
process, as Hamilton, Ackerman, and McGinnis and Rappaport seem to do—to its participatory 
and deliberative nature, for example, or to the super-majority requirement—then we ought to 
prefer the sort of “original public meaning” approach favored by most current originalists. That 
approach, after all, seems most likely to capture the superior wisdom in question, which flows 
(on this view) from the broadly public nature of the Framing. On the other hand, if we attribute 
special wisdom to something about the Framers themselves—to their extraordinary erudition or 
foresight or abilities as statesmen, say—then we should look more specifically for actual 
intentions or judgments of those particular people (an “original intentions” approach that is 
currently out of fashion). 
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judges” from the political process would allow them to safeguard 
individual rights against “those ill humors which . . . sometimes 
disseminate among the people themselves.”126 The implication is 
that judicial review is a more trustworthy safeguard of rights than 
ordinary democracy—and thus that we ought to obey judicial rulings 
on rights as opposed to democratic decisions where the two conflict. 
The mid-twentieth-century theorist Alexander Bickel, in a 
similar vein, defended the “counter-majoritarian force” of judicial 
review on the ground that “courts have certain capacities for dealing 
with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not 
possess.”127 Many contemporary proponents of judicial review—
Christopher Eisgruber, Lawrence Sager, and Ronald Dworkin among 
them—similarly cite the “disinterestedness”128 or 
“detach[ment]”129 of life-tenured judges, or the “republican 
deliberation” characteristic of constitutional adjudication,130 as 
grounds for assigning certain issues of “principle” or “justice” to the 
courts. 
Framing-focused accounts point toward originalism, as we’ve 
seen. But Court-focused accounts need not support originalism and 
might very well oppose it. If life-tenured judges have special 
“capacities for dealing with matters of principle,” requiring them to 
locate and implement decisions made by long-dead Framers would 
seem a wasted effort. Why not simply allow these judges to engage 
with issues of principle directly? (It is perhaps no accident that none 
of these recent Court-focused theorists pays much attention in his 
work to the Framing process, or that none of them is an 
originalist.)131 
That said, there is nothing inconsistent about endorsing both 
Framing-focused and Court-focused versions of Moral Guidance, as 
Hamilton can be read to do. It might be the case that both the 
 
 126. Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 440. 
 127. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 25 (2d ed. 1986). 
 128. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 57 (2001). 
 129. LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 74 (2004). 
 130. RONALD M. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 31 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW]. 
 131. Dworkin’s critique of originalism is well-known, and its influence is evident in the 
critiques of Eisgruber and Sager, among others. See DWORKIN, MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 
22, at 33–57; EISGRUBER, supra note 128, at 25–44; SAGER, supra note 129, at 30–69. 
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Framing process and the process of subsequent constitutional 
adjudication—individually, perhaps, or in combination—are morally 
wiser on the relevant issues than the processes of normal democratic 
lawmaking. Indeed, it would seem that New Originalists who 
distinguish between constitutional “interpretation” (the derivation 
of the text’s original meaning) and constitutional “construction” 
(the application of the text to a particular issue when original 
meaning is underdeterminate)132 would have to adopt some sort of 
hybrid account in order to justify both the act of interpretation and 
the act of construction. This point actually presents a difficulty for 
New Originalism, but I will put it aside for now and return to it in 
Part VI.E. 
In my observation, these Court-focused versions of the Moral 
Guidance account handily outnumber their Framing-focused 
counterparts. If I am right about this, it might hint at something 
about the plausibility of Framing-focused versions, and of the 
originalism that flows from them. It is to this question of plausibility 
that I turn next. 
D. The Implausibility of Framing-focused Moral Guidance 
Framing-focused Moral Guidance accounts avoid the salient 
objections that apply to Values Imposition and Consent accounts. 
But they come with their own baggage. The claims they make about 
the superior moral wisdom of the Framing as a general matter are 
subject to reasonable doubt, to say the least. In particular cases, 
moreover, those claims will be especially vulnerable, for two related 
reasons. First, particular cases often will involve issues that the 
Framing generation could not have anticipated and therefore could 
not have used its supposedly superior wisdom to resolve. Second, 
the fact that a person subject to a constitutional command disagrees 
with the substance of that command will serve, for that person, as a 
reason to doubt the moral wisdom of the process that generated it, 
and thus to reject the command’s authority in that case. 
I will address each of these problems in turn, using the case of a 
hypothetical member of Congress, Cato, who must decide whether 
to obey the Constitution despite his disagreement with its content in 
his case. Suppose Cato is asked to vote for a bill that would allow 
 
 132. On this distinction, see the discussion in Part III.A, supra. 
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suspected terrorists to be detained indefinitely without trial. Cato 
thinks the bill is good policy, perhaps even necessary for national 
security. But he also believes the bill would violate the 
Constitution’s guarantee of due process of law. What reason does 
Cato have to obey the Constitution despite his substantive 
disagreement with the outcome of doing so? 
1. The salient defects of the Framing  
On a Framing-focused account, Cato’s reason to obey the 
Constitution is that the Framing process was morally wiser than the 
ordinary democratic process of which he is a part. Thus Cato is more 
likely to do the right thing, morally speaking, by obeying the 
Constitution than by acting on his own democratic judgment. But 
Cato will have good cause to doubt the underlying premise of this 
account. 
The generation that framed the original Constitution (ratified in 
1788) and the Bill of Rights (1791) tolerated slavery, and indeed 
affirmatively protected it in the document.133 It excluded women, 
most people of color, and many non-propertied people from the 
vote.134 It viewed Native Americans as uncivilized savages and 
barred most of them from citizenship altogether.135 Whatever 
decisional advantages might have flowed from the unusually 
participatory and deliberative nature of the Framing may well seem, 
to Cato, to have been compromised, if not entirely negated, by these 
salient exclusions from the process. And the supposed moral 
wisdom of those who did participate will appear suspect in light of 
their tolerance (often their endorsement) of slavery, colonial 
genocide, racism, gender hierarchy, and property-based oligarchy. 
Now it may seem that a requirement that the Framing process 
generally be morally wiser than ordinary politics sets the bar too high. 
A Framing-focused account demands only that the Framing process 
be relatively wise with respect to certain issues—namely those 
 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 prohibited Congress from banning the importation of 
slaves until 1808. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 prohibited free states from emancipating or 
harboring escaped slaves. In addition, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 counted slaves as three-fifths 
of a person for purposes of congressional representation (and therefore also representation in 
the electoral college, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2) and direct taxation. 
 134. See sources cited supra notes 94–98. 
 135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, for example, entirely excludes “Indians not taxed” from 
the population to be counted for representation purposes. 
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governed by the Constitution. But in fact this demand is more 
ambitious than it may at first appear. The Framing process, after all, 
determined both what to include in the Constitution and what to 
leave out of it. If Cato and the rest of us are bound by the 
Constitution, we are bound both by what the Constitution 
contains—by rules like the Due Process Clause and the Commerce 
Clause—and also by what the Constitution does not contain, in the 
sense that we are not free to give constitutional status to rules the 
Framers did not in fact include in the Constitution. So, for example, 
when originalists criticize decisions like Roe v. Wade for illegitimately 
“creating” or “expanding” constitutional rights, they are claiming 
that the judges who decided those cases were disobeying the 
Constitution, not by failing to implement rules it includes, but rather 
by implementing rules it does not include. 
If Cato is to defer to the judgments of the Framing generation 
with respect to the rules they included in the Constitution, then he 
also must defer to their judgments with respect to the rules they left 
out of it. Cato must defer to the Framing, for example, on questions 
involving the rights to life, liberty, and property—subjects included 
within the scope of the Due Process Clauses—and also on questions 
involving claimed rights to, say, education or health care, subjects 
(arguably) not included within the scope of those clauses. Cato must 
treat life, liberty, and property as constitutionally protected, and he 
must treat education or health care as not constitutionally 
protected.136 
On a Moral Guidance account, this means Cato must attribute to 
the Framing a moral wisdom that is quite broad—wisdom not only 
with respect to the rules included in the Constitution, but also with 
respect to the choice of which rules to include and which rules to 
omit. It will not be enough, on a Framing-focused account, for Cato 
 
 136. The fact that Cato and others subject to constitutional law are prohibited from 
treating these entitlements as constitutional in stature does not, of course, prevent Congress or 
other sub-constitutional lawmakers from protecting them through statutes or other sub-
constitutional means. To be bound by the Framers’ decision not to include these rights in the 
Constitution is to be bound by their decision to leave these issues to ordinary, sub-
constitutional democratic politics. And I should make it clear that I am not assuming that rights 
to education or to health care cannot in fact legitimately be found in the Constitution. These 
seem like plausible examples of subjects “left out” of the Constitution, but there may be 
reasonable arguments to the contrary. See, e.g., SAGER, supra note 129, at 87–88 (suggesting that 
the right to medical care is part of a constitutionally guaranteed, but judicially unenforceable, 
“right to minimum welfare”). I use them here only by way of example. 
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to believe that the Framing possessed superior moral wisdom on 
issues covered by constitutional rules, like the protection of life, 
liberty, and property, or the freedom of speech and religion, or 
equality, or the regulation of interstate commerce. Cato also will 
have to believe that the Framing was comparatively wise with 
respect to issues not covered by constitutional rules, like education 
and health care. 
Moral Guidance accounts thus make bold claims about the 
relative moral wisdom of the Framing. It is quite unlikely that our 
actual Framing can live up to these claims, given its salient 
substantive misjudgments (the protection of slavery, for example) 
and its troubling procedural defects (the omission of women, of 
most people of color, and of many nonpropertied citizens). So it will 
take a very big leap of faith for Cato to buy into the Framing-focused 
Moral Guidance account in the first place. 
2. The problem of unforeseen circumstances 
But suppose Cato does accept the Moral Guidance premise that 
the Framing process, as a general matter, is morally wiser than he is 
(as a participant in ordinary democratic politics). Cato still might 
reasonably reject that premise as applied to his particular case. 
In creating the rule embodied in the Due Process Clause—“No 
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law”—the Framing generation, after all, could not 
have had the facts of his case in mind. Americans in the late 
eighteenth century had no experience of world-wide terrorist 
movements, the threat of nuclear or biological terrorism, the 
hijacking of jetliners for use as passenger-laden missiles, or for that 
matter of a society anywhere near as ideologically, racially, 
ethnically, and religiously diverse as our own. Indeed they could not 
have anticipated these developments with even the remotest degree 
of accuracy. In requiring due process for the deprivation of liberty, 
then, the Framing generation was not bringing its (by-hypothesis) 
superior moral wisdom to bear on anything like the actual problem 
Cato now faces. 
So even if Cato is inclined to defer to the judgments of the 
Framing as a general matter, he has no reason to defer to the 
judgment of the Framing as applied to his particular case—simply 
because there is no such judgment to defer to. The rule embodied in 
the Due Process Clause does not reflect a specific judgment about  
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how the facts of Cato’s case, unforeseen and unforeseeable by the 
Framers, should be resolved. 
To be clear, the problem here is not that there is no 
constitutional law on the issue Cato faces. Cato, remember, has 
interpreted the Due Process Clause to prohibit the bill he is 
considering. So we are putting to one side the underdeterminacy 
issues that might hinder the identification of “original meaning” in 
any given case.137 The problem at hand, rather, is that the (by-
hypothesis) applicable legal rule does not reflect (cannot reflect) an 
actual judgment by the rule-maker—the Framing process—with 
respect to the particular circumstances confronting Cato. In enacting 
a general rule that covers Cato’s case, the Framers did not 
specifically consider Cato’s case itself. In this respect, the Due 
Process Clause is no different from most general normative rules: it 
applies by its terms to cases that its enactors could not have 
foreseen.138 
Nor is the problem here the worry that the Framing process, had 
it actually considered these circumstances, would not or might not 
have resolved them wisely. The problem is that the Framing process 
did not consider these circumstances and thus did not resolve them 
at all. So Cato cannot know how the Framing would have resolved his 
case if it had considered it. And he cannot defer to a nonexistent 
judgment.139 
 
 137. On the typical underdeterminacy of original meaning and the consequent need, 
recognized by most New Originalists, for constitutional “construction,” see the discussions in 
Part III.A, supra, and in Part III.C, supra, in the text accompanying notes 63–72. 
 138. This is one cause of the phenomenon noted by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics: 
that “all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement 
which shall be correct.” ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 927, 
1020 (Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans. 1941). General normative rules often produce 
“incorrect” results in particular cases because those cases involve circumstances the rule-makers 
did not anticipate. 
 139. Of course, Cato could attempt to construct a specific judgment that the Framers might 
have rendered had they considered the particular circumstances he faces. If Cato attempts this, 
however, he has left the realm of descriptive identifications of judgments actually made by the 
Framers, and entered the very different sphere of normatively infused imaginings of what the 
Framers would or could or should have decided. Whatever comparative moral wisdom resides in 
the judgments of the Framers has become attenuated and perhaps has been completely 
abandoned. In this sense, the construction of counterfactual “judgments” of the Framers 
resembles the construction of hypothetical “consent.” See supra Part IV.G. With both devices, 
whatever normative force flows from the fact of an actual decision (of the Framers, or of the 
consenting party) is lost when imagined decisions are substituted for actual ones. 
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Note, too, that this problem cuts in two directions: it afflicts 
both cases where a constitutional rule applies and cases where no 
constitutional rule applies. In Cato’s case, his obedience to an 
applicable constitutional rule (“No person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”) would not be 
justified by the premise of the Framing-focused account, because 
there is no specific judgment of the Framing to defer to in his case. 
But imagine a case in which no constitutional rule applies. 
Suppose, for example, that an originalist judge in 1954—call him 
Gaius—must decide whether enforced racial segregation in public 
schools should be declared unconstitutional; and suppose that Gaius 
believes that the original meaning of the applicable constitutional 
provision, which provides that “No State shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” 
allows school segregation. By Gaius’s lights, there is no 
constitutional rule on the issue of segregation: the Constitution 
neither prohibits it nor requires it.140 
Nonetheless, Gaius might conclude that because the process of 
framing the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes the equal-
protection rule, did not consider (could not have considered) “public 
education in the light of its full development and its present place in 
American life throughout the Nation” in 1954,141 there is no actual 
judgment of the Framing to defer to. And thus Gaius reasonably 
might decide to, in effect, disobey the Constitution by ruling that the 
Constitution prohibits school segregation, on the ground that the 
Framing-focused Moral Guidance account offers no reason to defer 
to a nonexistent judgment of the Framing. Gaius’s disobedience 
would take the form, not of disobeying an existing constitutional 
rule, but rather of enforcing a nonexistent one.142 
 
 140. Or we might say, without affecting the substance of the argument, that there is a 
constitutional rule allowing (but not prohibiting or requiring) school segregation. 
 141. This language is of course taken from the Supreme Court’s actual decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 387 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954), in which the Court held that enforced racial 
segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause. One way to read Brown (not 
the only way, and probably not the best way) is as an act of justified disobedience of the original 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause—disobedience, because the original meaning of the 
Clause allowed school segregation; justified, because the Framing-focused Moral Guidance 
account offers no reason to obey the Constitution absent a specific judgment of the Framing. 
 142. Or (again) we might say that Gaius has disobeyed an existing constitutional rule to 
the effect that school segregation is allowed (but not prohibited or required). 
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We can begin to perceive now the serious plausibility problems 
that afflict Framing-focused Moral Guidance accounts. Those 
accounts make ambitious claims about the general moral wisdom of 
the Framing process, claims that are substantially undermined by the 
salient moral errors and process deficiencies of the actual Framing. 
And they require a relatively specific judgment by the Framing in any 
given case, a judgment that is increasingly unlikely to exist as we 
move farther away from the world the Framing generation knew. 
3. The problem of disagreement 
Cutting across these two considerable difficulties is a third: a 
person subject to constitutional law, like Cato or Gaius, will disagree 
with the substance of the Constitution in any case that matters. A 
subject who agrees with what the Constitution requires in her case 
will of course simply do whatever that thing is; she will not need to 
ask whether to obey the Constitution at all. Constitutional authority 
(like all legal authority) makes a real difference only when a legal 
subject disagrees with the content of a constitutional command. 
The problem for Moral Guidance accounts, however, is that a 
subject’s disagreement with a constitutional command also serves as 
a reason to reject that command’s authority. This is because 
substantive disagreement constitutes evidence that the basis of that 
authority—the superior moral wisdom of the Framing process—does 
not in fact exist. 
Consider Cato’s belief that the terrorist-detention bill is morally 
good policy. The Framing-focused Moral Guidance account tells Cato 
that, despite this belief, he should obey the Due Process Clause and 
vote against the bill because the process of framing that Clause was 
morally wiser than he (as part of the democratic process) is. But 
Cato’s moral approval of the bill is evidence, for Cato, that the 
Clause’s prohibition of the bill is morally incorrect; and this in turn 
is evidence that the Framing process that authored the Clause was 
not so morally wise after all. Cato’s disagreement with the content of 
constitutional law thus gives Cato reason to question the authority of 
constitutional law. And the requirement of content-independence—
that legal authority be based on something other than the moral 
content of the law in question—is undermined. 
I said in Part V.A that a Moral Guidance account cannot provide 
a reason to obey constitutional commands one knows to be 
erroneous; Moral Guidance accounts require uncertainty about the 
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requirements of morality. We can assume for purposes of the 
argument that Cato is afflicted by this uncertainty and that most 
actual subjects of constitutional law share this prevalent human 
affliction. This is not the same thing, however, as assuming that 
subjects of constitutional law like Cato typically lack strong beliefs 
about the requirements of morality. It seems likely that most people 
in a position to decide whether to obey the Constitution will, most 
of the time, have their own views about what morality requires. 
(Indeed we should hope this is the case, as a world in which 
legislators, government officials, and for that matter ordinary 
citizens typically are entirely at sea about what they ought to do 
would be a very scary place in which to live.) So we can assume that 
decision-makers like Cato, while recognizing their own uncertainty 
about what morality requires, will at the same time have beliefs 
about what morality requires, beliefs upon which they would feel 
comfortable acting absent a constitutional command to the contrary. 
To believe that morality requires some action (X) is to believe 
that a command to do not-X is morally incorrect. If Cato believes, 
then, that morality requires X—say, the detention without trial of 
suspected terrorists—then Cato necessarily also believes that a 
command to the contrary—say, the constitutional requirement of 
due process of law—is morally incorrect. Now this belief by itself 
need not convince Cato to disobey the constitutional command. 
Cato, we are assuming, accepts the premise of the Moral Guidance 
account that the Constitution, in essence, is more likely to be 
morally correct than he is. Cato’s acceptance of this premise might 
convince him to disregard his (inconsistent) belief that the 
Constitution is, in this instance, morally incorrect. 
But Cato’s belief that the Constitution is morally incorrect in 
this instance will serve as evidence, for Cato, against the proposition 
that the Constitution is more likely to be morally correct than he is. 
Consider again the analogy of parental authority. We can accept the 
premise that parents, generally speaking, are the best decision-
makers about their children’s welfare while simultaneously believing 
that a particular parental decision is incorrect. But our belief that a 
particular decision is wrong may undermine our acceptance of the 
general premise of parental authority. If we perceive a certain 
parental judgment—say, the decision not to inoculate one’s 
children—as especially foolish, our confidence in the general 
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principle of superior parental decision-making capacity will be called 
into doubt. 
And note that—crucially—we need not reject the premise of 
parental authority as a general matter in order to determine that it 
fails in this particular case. We may believe that parents are the best 
decision-makers for their children in many more cases than not, and 
even that these particular parents are the best decision-makers in 
many more cases than not, while still concluding, based on this one 
(by our lights) extraordinarily foolish decision, that these parents are 
not the best decision-makers in this case. Our belief that a particular 
decision is wrong, in other words, may convince us that this case is 
an exception to the general rule of parental authority. 
The same possibility obtains with respect to Cato. Cato’s belief 
that the requirement of due process is morally erroneous in his case 
might lead him to question the (already questionable) underlying 
premise of constitutional authority, namely the supposedly superior 
wisdom of the Framing process. Or, less dramatically, it might cause 
him to reject the application of that premise to his particular case, 
even as he continues to accept it more generally. Cato might 
conclude that because the Constitution (by his lights) is morally 
wrong in this case, the premise of superior constitutional wisdom 
therefore does not apply in this case. And so Cato might conclude 
that the Constitution simply does not possess authority in his case; 
he has no duty to obey its command. 
Note, too, that the persuasiveness of this reasoning is enhanced 
to the extent there are independent grounds to question the wisdom 
of the Constitution. And under a Framing-focused Moral Guidance 
account, as we have already seen, at least two independent grounds 
are likely to exist in any given case. The first is the set of reasons to 
question the plausibility of Framing-focused accounts as a general 
matter: the arbitrarily exclusionary nature of the Framing and the 
saliently erroneous moral judgments made by the Framers. The 
second is the unlikelihood that the Framers considered any given set 
of circumstances like Cato’s when they framed their constitutional 
rules. 
These grounds, in combination with the evidentiary force of 
disagreement, spell trouble for a Framing-focused account. In order 
for the account to work, legal subjects like Cato will have to accept 
its rather questionable premise of generally superior moral wisdom; 
they will have to agree that this premise applies specifically to a 
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given case the Framers are unlikely to (perhaps could not) have 
foreseen; and they will have to do so in spite of their substantive 
disagreement with the constitutional law in that case and their 
consequent doubt about the basis for the law’s authority. 
4. The failure of the Framing-focused account 
At bottom, then, the Framing-focused Moral Guidance approach 
is not a very persuasive grounding of constitutional authority. Part of 
the problem is context-sensitive: the salient moral failings of the 
American Framing are not inevitable features of any constitutional 
system. Nonetheless, they are features of the system we have. And 
the other components of the problem seem more universal. No 
process of constitution-making can envision every circumstance in 
which its rules will apply; as a constitution gets older and older, this 
shortcoming will become more and more relevant. And every 
constitution must be capable of motivating obedience even by those 
who strongly disagree with the substance of its commands. If the 
only ground for obedience is Moral Guidance, then, constitutional 
authority often will fail, in our system or in any other. 
Of course, if a Framing-focused Moral Guidance account cannot 
persuasively justify constitutional authority itself, then it cannot 
persuasively dictate originalism or any other method of 
constitutional interpretation. Framing-focused accounts are less 
saliently implausible than Values Imposition and Consent accounts, 
but they turn out not to be plausible enough. 
E. A Word About Court-focused Accounts 
Although I won’t linger on Court-focused versions of Moral 
Guidance here (because they do not seem to support originalism), I 
should note before moving on that the difficulties of Framing-
focused accounts will affect Court-focused accounts as well, though 
perhaps not quite so severely. Supreme Court decision-making does 
not feature the obviously exclusionary defects of our Framing, but it 
does feature many arguable defects of its own. The Court is an elite 
institution populated solely by lawyers, a disproportionate number 
of whom are white, male, and middle-aged or beyond. At any given 
time, moreover, it consists of no more than nine members, 
substantially limiting its experience of, and need to engage with, 
diverse viewpoints and interests as compared to democratic politics. 
The notion that the Justices decide cases free of political, moral, or 
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other predispositions or biases has long been discredited. As with 
the Framing, then, though mostly for different reasons, the idea that 
the Court is substantially wiser than ordinary democracy on the 
subjects covered (and not covered) by constitutional law is at the 
very least problematic. 
The problem of unforeseen circumstances may not be as acute on 
Court-focused accounts as on their Framing-focused rivals, simply 
because the Court (unlike the Framing) is an ongoing institution 
capable of addressing new issues as they arise. In practice, however, 
a Court that decides fewer than 100 cases per year, most of which 
are not constitutional cases, cannot of course specifically address 
every possible variant of a given constitutional problem. There will 
be many cases of first impression that the Court has not directly 
considered, even though they are covered by some general rule or 
principle announced by the Court. 
And the problem of disagreement applies to judicially created 
rules or commands just as it applies to rules or commands 
promulgated by the Framers. A person subject to a judicial doctrine 
or decision with which she strongly disagrees is just as likely, for 
that reason, to question the supposedly superior wisdom of the 
institution that issued that doctrine or decision as is a person subject 
to an original constitutional rule she finds disagreeable. 
I am deeply skeptical, in short, that any version of a Moral 
Guidance account can convincingly justify the authority of 
constitutional law. But Court-focused accounts seem slightly less 
hopeless—or perhaps just hopeless in different ways—than the type 
of Framing-focused account that might entail originalism. 
VI. AUTHORITY BY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
There is one more prevalent account of constitutional authority 
that might be used to justify originalism. I call it a Dispute Resolution 
account, and I explore it in this Part. In its most popular (and in my 
view most persuasive) form—what I call the Footnote Four version—
Dispute Resolution can justify at most a selective use of originalism. 
Another form of Dispute Resolution (the Rule of Law version) has 
been offered in support of originalism; but it provides weak support 
at best and, more to the point, it is not particularly convincing as an 
account of authority. 
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A. The Normative Force of Dispute Resolution 
There is a long and not entirely user-friendly history of justifying 
law as a means of resolving, avoiding, or mitigating disputes. 
Dispute resolution was at the core of Hobbes’s now-infamous 
defense of absolute monarchy: absolutist law, Hobbes thought, was 
necessary to avoid the conflict and chaos that would prevail in a state 
of nature.143 Though Locke’s thought often is contrasted with that of 
Hobbes, and in particular is frequently cited for the proposition that 
government exists to protect natural rights, Locke too justified law 
at least in part as a way to resolve or avoid costly disputes. Locke’s 
central objection to Hobbes, in fact, was his observation that a 
Hobbesian absolute monarch frequently would be self-interested and 
thus incapable of resolving disputes fairly.144 
A somewhat oversimplified version of Hobbes’s account 
illustrates the basic normative mechanics of Dispute Resolution. We 
are obligated to obey the sovereign, Hobbes suggested, because 
failure to obey will leave disputes unresolved, allowing society to fall 
into chaos.145 This obligation applies even—indeed especially—
when we disagree with the sovereign’s commands; if we were free to 
disobey in cases of disagreement, the dispute-avoidance function of 
the sovereign would be entirely frustrated. The sovereign, in other 
words, has authority over us, not by virtue of its superior wisdom (a 
Moral Guidance account) or our agreement to be bound (a Consent 
account), but simply because obedience is the only way to avoid 
extremely costly disputes. 
Notice that the goal of dispute resolution (or avoidance, or 
mitigation) on this account provides a content-independent reason 
for action. It gives us a reason (in Hobbes’s view, a duty) to obey 
legal commands regardless of the content of those commands—
regardless of whether what the sovereign orders us to do otherwise 
would be morally correct. Our disagreement with the content of a 
 
 143. See generally HOBBES, supra note 80. 
 144. See LOCKE, supra note 81, at 316–17, 369–74. For an extended discussion of Locke’s 
dispute-resolution account of law and government, and in particular his critique of Hobbes, see 
PETERS, supra note 42, at 119–22. 
 145. In fact Hobbes filtered his dispute-resolution justification of law through the device of 
constructive consent: he argued in essence that subjects ought to obey an absolute monarch 
because, acting rationally, they would have consented to absolute monarchy, given the 
opportunity to do so, as a way to avoid chaos and violence. See PETERS, supra note 42, at 57–59. 
But we can put this consensualist overlay to one side for present purposes. 
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command is irrelevant to our duty to obey it. (Dispute Resolution 
accounts thus avoid the fatal flaw of Values Imposition accounts.) 
Moreover, our disagreement with the content of a command is not, 
by itself, evidence that the sovereign lacks authority over us—unlike 
on Moral Guidance accounts, which make authority contingent on 
superior moral wisdom. Conceptually speaking, then, a Hobbesian 
Dispute Resolution account has advantages over the Values 
Imposition and Moral Guidance alternatives. And descriptively 
speaking it is, or at least might be, an improvement on Consent 
accounts, because it does not demand that we (the subjects of law) 
give our actual consent to be bound by that law. 
We might take this basic Hobbesian idea and deploy it to fashion 
a Dispute Resolution account of the authority of the Constitution. If 
the costs of obeying constitutional law are lower than the costs of 
the disputes that would result, or remain, if we disobey, then we 
have a content-independent, Hobbesian reason to obey the 
Constitution. We have, that is, an account of constitutional 
authority. 
Of course, we are going to have to do much better than this bare 
Hobbesian account to justify constitutional authority convincingly. 
As Locke observed, the costs of obeying the law when that law is 
made by an absolutist monarch often will outweigh the costs of the 
alternatives. An absolutist monarch, after all, will be prone to 
“resolve” disputes in his own favor, leading to the sort of “long train 
of abuses” of which both Locke and, later, Thomas Jefferson (in the 
Declaration of Independence) complained.146 So we will need to 
explain why the Constitution is a particularly trustworthy resolver of 
disputes—why it is especially impartial or fair, for example, in 
comparison to the alternatives—in order to endorse constitutional 
authority on Dispute Resolution grounds. 
As it happens, we have such an account available to us. It is the 
account suggested by the Supreme Court in the famous fourth 
footnote of Carolene Products and later elucidated by the 
constitutional theorist John Hart Ely. 
B. Footnote Four 
In what has become known as “Footnote Four,” the Court in its 
1938 decision in Carolene Products suggested that aggressive judicial 
 
 146. See LOCKE, supra note 81, at 463; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
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review of legislation is appropriate in circumstances where the 
democratic process cannot be trusted. The source of distrust might 
be the fact that the legislation in question “restricts . . . political 
processes,”147 such as a law penalizing criticism of the sitting 
government. Or it might be a worry that the legislation reflects or 
perpetuates “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities,”148 
such as a law requiring racial segregation in public schools. 
The Carolene Court offered its account only as a tentative 
rationale for non-deferential judicial review in some circumstances; 
John Hart Ely later expanded it into a rationale for judicial review 
itself.149 Carefully considered, and perhaps enlarged somewhat, a 
version of the Footnote Four approach might in fact be deployed for 
greater purposes still: to ground the general authority of 
constitutional law.150 The account acknowledges, first, that ordinary 
democratic politics are the preferred, default mechanism for 
resolving society’s disputes about substantive values and outcomes, 
and thus for making law. But it holds that democratic politics cannot 
always be relied upon to resolve substantive disputes acceptably. The 
“ins”—those currently holding political power, namely the electoral 
majority and those who represent them in office—have strong 
incentives to “make sure the outs stay out,” as Ely put it.151 So 
legislation that has this effect—legislation restricting political speech 
or voting rights, for example—cannot be trusted as genuinely in the 
public interest; it might simply be a self-interested gambit to 
consolidate power. Rules of constitutional law (such as protections 
for freedom of speech) can make it difficult to enact these power-
entrenching measures. Constitutional adjudication, moreover, can 
fairly resolve disputes over whether any given measure is in fact 
unjustifiably power-entrenching. 
In a similar vein, majoritarian democracy sometimes is distorted 
by irrational biases against certain groups of citizens—those 
possessing disfavored racial or ethnic traits or religious beliefs, for 
example. The views and interests of these citizens might not be 
 
 147. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 150. Elsewhere I have described and defended at length a justification of constitutional law 
that might be considered an expanded version of the Footnote Four account. See PETERS, supra 
note 42, at 246–348. 
 151. ELY, supra note 149, at 106. 
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taken seriously in the political process, and as a result, they might be 
unfairly denied benefits or saddled with burdens, as (for example) 
with Jim Crow laws in the pre-Civil-Rights-era South. Constitutional 
rules (such as a requirement of “equal protection of the laws”) can 
prevent or mitigate this kind of biased legislation; constitutional 
adjudication can resolve disputes about whether any given law is 
unfairly biased. 
The Footnote Four approach therefore justifies constitutional 
law and adjudication on Dispute Resolution grounds. It holds that 
establishing, obeying, and applying certain constitutional rules will 
resolve some disputes better than ordinary democracy could resolve 
them. A person’s reason to obey a constitutional command with 
which she disagrees, on this account, is that doing so will resolve (or 
avoid or mitigate) some costly disagreement that otherwise would 
not be so well resolved (or avoided or mitigated). 
The Footnote Four approach depends, of course, on the premise 
that constitutional law and procedures are better than ordinary 
democracy at resolving the kinds of disputes to which they apply. 
Our justification of constitutional authority must be better than 
Hobbes’s attempt to justify absolute monarchy; it must demonstrate 
that constitutional law can resolve disputes, not simply by force, but 
in a way that both sides can accept. (Recall in this regard Jeremy 
Waldron’s central requirement for a dispute-resolving procedure: it 
must be capable of being “subscribed to by people on both sides of 
any . . . disagreements.”152) Ely underwrote this premise with an 
emphasis on judicial independence: constitutional judges, because of 
their electoral insularity, are likely to be comparatively resistant to 
the majority’s temptation to entrench its political power and to its 
occasional tendency toward irrational prejudice; they are “in a 
position to objectively assess claims” that these democratic 
malfunctions are occurring.153 In a word, constitutional adjudication 
is more impartial than democratic politics on questions of democratic 
dysfunction. Judicial decisions on these issues therefore can be more 
readily accepted by those subject to them than (potentially self-
interested or biased) democratic resolutions of these claims could be. 
To Ely’s invocation of judicial independence, we can add the 
observation that the Framing processes are even more insulated than 
 
 152. Waldron, Core, supra note 44, at 1371; see supra Part II.D. 
 153. ELY, supra note 149, at 103. 
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life-tenured judges from contemporary politics. The Framers who 
authored and ratified most of the Constitution’s key provisions have 
long since died—a weakness of Consent accounts and Framing-
focused Moral Guidance accounts, but an advantage on the Footnote 
Four approach. Those (now-dead) Framers obviously do not stand to 
benefit by entrenching the power of current majorities or officials; as 
such, the rules they authored can be seen as relatively impartial 
principles for regulating self-interest in current democratic 
government. 
On the other hand, as I have noted, there is no good reason to 
believe that the Framers or their generation were less susceptible 
than we are today to the danger of irrational bias against “discrete 
and insular minorities.” We might therefore not trust rules laid 
down by the Framers to govern disputes regarding the treatment of, 
say, racial minorities or women. This fact has implications for the 
type of interpretive methodology supported by the Footnote Four 
account, as I explain below. 
C. Footnote Four and Originalism 
The Footnote Four version of a Dispute Resolution account 
justifies constitutional authority as a relatively impartial way to 
prevent democratic power-entrenchment and bias and to resolve 
disputes about whether any given law or policy suffers from these 
failures. This approach turns out to provide only limited support for 
an originalist interpretive methodology, valuing it in some doctrinal 
areas and rejecting it in others. It also allows for (indeed demands) 
nonoriginalist interpretation where original meaning runs out. I 
discuss each of these implications below. 
1. Selective originalism 
On the Footnote Four account, there is no special magic in 
decisions made by the Framers; the value of deferring to those 
decisions lies in the impartiality that flows from that deference, not 
in the supposed moral wisdom of the Framing generation or the 
super-majoritarian process they employed. This means that a 
Footnote Four judge will employ originalist interpretation where it 
promotes impartiality and will reject it where it has the opposite 
effect. 
As I suggested above, deference to the Framers on some 
constitutional issues seems likely to promote impartiality. 
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Government officials and political majorities have a salient self-
interest in the resolution of disputes involving the potential 
entrenchment of their own power. But the Framers and their 
generation no longer have any self-interest at stake in these disputes; 
they have been dead for decades or centuries.154 For a contemporary 
interpreter to defer to judgments of the Framers on these questions, 
then, is to enhance the impartiality, and the appearance of 
impartiality, by which these disputes are resolved. 
Many important questions in constitutional law fall into this 
“potential power-entrenchment” category and thus are candidates 
for originalist interpretation. Questions of the scope and nature of 
political participation and political influence—involving the right to 
vote, for instance, or to engage in political speech, or to seek or hold 
office—are obvious examples. So are questions involving the 
allocation of power between the different levels and branches of 
government, which in American constitutional law typically are 
referred to as issues of federalism and separation of powers. Issues of 
criminal procedure—the processes by which those in power can 
wield the coercive force of the state—fit comfortably in this category. 
Indeed the category probably includes process-related questions 
more generally, such as the conditions under which government may 
choose the winners and losers of regulation (many equal-protection 
and so-called “substantive” due-process cases) or take private 
property for public use. 
These topics comprise much of federal constitutional law in the 
United States. But they are far from the whole of it. The Footnote 
Four approach suggests a second function for the relative 
impartiality of constitutional law: it can protect members of “discrete 
and insular” minority groups against irrational majority bias. On this 
score, appeal to the judgments of the Framers is likely to be less 
useful, as I suggested above. On questions of race or gender 
relations, for example, contemporary citizens might perceive at least 
as much irrational bias among the eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Framers as among our own generation. Originalism, then, 
might be inappropriate in resolving disputes about racial or gender 
 
 154. McGinnis and Rappaport suggest that even recent constitutional amendments might 
be relatively immune to self-interest by virtue of the super-majority requirement for their 
enactment, which simulates a sort of Rawlsian “veil of ignorance.” See McGinnis & Rappaport, 
Good Constitution, supra note 122, at 1708–10; McGinnis & Rappaport, Pragmatic Defense, supra 
note 122, at 388–89. 
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equality (as indeed the Brown Court suggested when it refused to 
“turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment 
was adopted”155), or about other arguable manifestations of equality 
(based on sexual orientation, for example) on which the danger of 
irrational bias seems at least as great among the Framers as in 
contemporary politics. The same point might apply to disputes over 
religious freedom or forms of nonpolitical expression (sexual speech, 
for example).156 
A Footnote Four judge, then, need not be (should not be) 
committed to originalism across the board. Instead, she will pick and 
choose an originalist methodology as appropriate to enhance the 
perceived impartiality of her decisions. Originalism might be more 
appropriate in (say) political-speech or federalism cases than in (say) 
race-relations or freedom-of-religion cases. 
2. Originalism as a starting point 
Even where originalism seems an appropriate means of fostering 
impartiality, it does not exhaust an interpreter’s options on the 
Footnote Four approach. A Framing-focused Moral Guidance 
account, remember, equates constitutional authority with judgments 
ratified at the Framing; if those judgments run out, so does the 
authority of the Constitution. But on the Footnote Four approach, 
the judgments of the Framers are only one potential source of 
impartiality. Indeed, both the Carolene Products Court and Ely looked 
for impartiality not primarily to the Framers, but to the Court and 
the adjudicative process of which it is a part. Their arguments 
suggest that the political insularity of constitutional judges, and 
perhaps the features of legal reasoning more generally (its obsession 
with authority, its language of general principle, its requirement of 
responsiveness to competing arguments), make constitutional 
adjudication a more impartial forum than ordinary politics for 
resolving questions of potential entrenchment or bias.157 
 
 155. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
 156. There is a significant potential caveat to this suggestion, however. If the Framers can 
be shown to have taken a particular position despite their evident bias, deference to that 
position can be perceived as impartial. So, for example, if the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not object to race-based affirmative action, despite their demonstrably 
benighted views on race by today’s lights, then deferring to that position in resolving a 
contemporary dispute about affirmative action might be seen as relatively impartial. 
 157. Ely himself, following Alexander Hamilton, emphasized the political insularity of 
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The payoff of this flexibility is that constitutional authority can 
exist on the Footnote Four account even if the Framers did not 
consider the particular issue being addressed—even, in fact, if the 
original meaning of the text does not fully resolve that issue. In such 
instances, authority cannot flow from the (nonexistent, or at least 
inapplicable) superior wisdom of the Framing. But it might flow 
from the relative impartiality of the adjudicative process. 
This fact has obvious advantages for those questions (involving 
gender or race relations, for example) on which resort to original 
meaning would not enhance impartiality. Courts can use 
nonoriginalist constitutional interpretation to resolve these issues 
relatively impartially and thus authoritatively. But it also bears fruit 
in cases (involving political participation, federalism, separation of 
powers, etc.) where originalism seems most appropriate. Because 
courts, too, are relatively impartial on these questions as compared 
to ordinary politics, they can use nonoriginalist methodologies to 
resolve them where originalist methodology—the search for 
determinate original meaning—fails to do so. 
As an example, consider again our legislator Cato’s conundrum 
regarding the due-process rights of suspected terrorists. A Framing-
focused Moral Guidance account faces two related obstacles to 
resolving this question authoritatively. First, there might not be any 
original meaning that governs the question. Second, even if there is 
an identifiable, controlling original meaning (as we assumed in 
assessing the Framing-focused account in Part V.D), there may be no 
directly on-point judgment of the Framers regarding these facts or 
 
judges. See ELY, supra note 149, at 101–04; see also Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83. 
“Legal Process” theorists of the mid-twentieth century, most prominently Bickel and Herbert 
Wechsler, emphasized the prominent role of principle in judicial decision-making, as does the 
more-recent work of Ronald Dworkin. See BICKEL, supra note 127, at 23–28; Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S 
LAW, supra note 130, at 31; DWORKIN, MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 22, at 69–71. I have 
focused on the requirement of responsiveness in some of my own work. See Christopher J. 
Peters, Participation, Representation, and Principled Adjudication, 8 LEG. THEORY 185 (2002); 
Christopher J. Peters, Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 96 NW. L. REV. 1, 20–
21 (2001). Recently Jack Balkin has touched on all of these themes in defending an interpretive 
approach he calls “living originalism” (or “framework originalism”). See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM 129–37 (2011). Of course, most of these theorists do not consider themselves 
Footnote Four adherents; among them, I probably have come closest to endorsing something 
like the Footnote Four approach. See PETERS, supra note 42, at 255–72. I think, however, that 
many of these theories can be recast in Footnote Four or similar Dispute Resolution terms, as I 
suggest infra Part VI.G. 
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closely analogous ones. If either of these conditions holds, a 
Framing-focused account can supply no authoritative constitutional 
law to govern Cato’s case. 
Having no authoritative constitutional law to govern a case like 
this, or many other cases in which original meaning runs out or no 
on-point original judgment exists, is a real problem for a Framing-
focused Moral Guidance account. As I discuss in Part VI.E below, 
that problem has been exposed by the New Originalist move toward 
constitutional “construction” to fill the gaps left open by original 
meaning. But the Footnote Four approach avoids this problem 
altogether by allowing for authoritative constitutional resolution of 
these issues through adjudication. Even where the Framing 
generation did not resolve questions like the due-process rights of 
terrorism suspects, courts can resolve them in a way that is more 
impartial than (self-interested) democratic politics and therefore, on 
the Footnote Four account, can be authoritative. 
In this sense, even where originalism is appropriate on the 
Footnote Four approach, it functions as a starting point, not as the 
entirety of the interpretive process. And this is true in another sense 
as well. There may be circumstances—even on topics that seem 
suitable for originalism—in which an identifiable, on-point original 
meaning exists, and yet applying it simply would be unacceptable to 
most of those bound by the Constitution. Suppose, for example, that 
we determine with reasonable certainty that the original meaning of 
the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech prohibited 
only prior restraints on speech, not after-the-fact punishments. Or 
suppose we establish that the original meaning of Congress’ power 
“to regulate Commerce among the several States” encompassed only 
the specific acts of buying, selling, and bartering for the purchase or 
sale of goods.158 I think it is quite unlikely that most Americans 
today would accept these limits on the freedom of speech or the 
regulatory power of Congress. And yet, jettisoning constitutional 
standards in these areas altogether would defeat the purpose of 
constitutional law (on the Footnote Four approach), which is to 
 
 158. Justice Clarence Thomas attributes an original meaning of roughly this scope to the 
Commerce Clause. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–87 (1985) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“At the time the original Constitution was ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling, 
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”). 
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remove these questions from decision by the self-interested majority. 
Footnote Four solves the problem by subjecting these issues to 
resolution by the still-relatively-impartial judicial process. 
The Footnote Four approach, unlike the Framing-focused version 
of Moral Guidance, thus allows constitutional adjudication to 
supplement, and in some cases perhaps even to supplant, original 
meaning where the latter is incomplete or just plain unacceptable. It 
probably is no coincidence that this sort of hybrid approach is a 
better fit than thoroughgoing originalism with our actual 
constitutional practice of utilizing “many pathways of change,” in 
Reva Siegel’s phrase.159 
D. The (Relative) Plausibility of Footnote Four 
All this is well and good. (Or maybe not so much, if you are a 
thoroughgoing originalist.) But it’s only so much ink if the Footnote 
Four account turns out to be as flawed as Framing-focused Moral 
Guidance and the others I have canvassed. I think Footnote Four is a 
substantial improvement over these rivals as an account of 
constitutional authority. Which is not to say that it has no 
weaknesses. 
1. The salient defects of the Framing revisited 
Recall, first, the weaknesses in the claim that the moral wisdom 
of the Framing was superior, generally speaking, to that of 
contemporary democratic politics: the Framing generation made 
salient moral errors, and the procedures of the Framing were 
arbitrarily exclusionary. These problems are less serious on the 
Footnote Four account. What matters to that account is not the 
supposed moral wisdom of the Framing, but rather the relative 
impartiality it can provide as compared with contemporary 
democracy. And the fact that the Framing was exclusionary and in 
some ways morally benighted need not affect its relative impartiality. 
As we have seen, the Framers’ decisions regarding the scope and 
allocation of government power are, when applied to today’s 
problems, untainted by self-interest, and this remains true regardless 
of the Framers’ attitudes toward (say) race or their exclusion of (say) 
women from the constitutional process. Of course, the Framers’ 
 
 159. Siegel, supra note 106, at 1405. 
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views on race or gender undermine their impartiality with respect to 
contemporary disputes involving those topics; but this objection can 
be addressed on the Footnote Four account by simply avoiding 
originalism in deciding these disputes. Because that account derives 
constitutional authority from the impartiality, not just of the 
Framing, but also of subsequent adjudication, defects in the Framing 
need not call the entirety of constitutional authority into question. 
2. The problem of unforeseen circumstances revisited 
Second, just as constitutional authority on the Footnote Four 
account does not depend solely on the Framing, neither does it depend 
solely on the existence of some relatively concrete judgment of the 
Framers involving the particular circumstances a decision-maker now 
faces. The Framing-focused Moral Guidance account is flummoxed by 
cases the Framers did not anticipate; it offers no reason to obey 
constitutional rules in such cases. But the Footnote Four account offers 
a reason for obedience. To obey a rule created by the Framers, even as 
applied to a case the Framers did not foresee, is (to that extent) to defer 
to a relatively impartial source of decision in that case. 
Consider again Cato’s decision whether to obey the Due Process 
Clause despite his disagreement with its content in his case. As a 
current holder of political power, Cato is self-interested in the 
question whether that power can be used to suppress political 
opposition. By obeying the Due Process Clause—a rule fashioned by 
eighteenth-century Framers with no stake in contemporary political 
controversies—Cato can resolve the question impartially, and can be 
seen as doing so. His decision thus can be accepted by those who 
disagree with it, in a way in which the opposite decision might not 
have been. 
Obedience to constitutional rules, therefore, can promote 
impartiality even when the rule-makers did not consider a particular 
case to which the rule applies. And note that the relevant rule-
makers, on the Footnote Four account, are much more numerous 
than on the Framing-focused Moral Guidance approach. Even if the 
Framers did not consider a case like Cato’s, a subsequent Court 
might have done so. Cato can resolve his quandary impartially by 
deferring to an on-point judicial decision even if there is no closely 
on-point original meaning to follow. 
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In fact, as I suggested above,160 the relative impartiality of 
constitutional adjudication can bring legitimacy absent any on-point 
decision at all. Suppose Cato’s bill becomes law and our hypothetical 
judge, Gaius, must determine its constitutionality. Even after looking 
at original meaning and precedent, it might be unclear what the Due 
Process Clause requires in this case. Whichever answer Gaius 
reaches, however, his decision can be perceived as more impartial 
than the self-interested actions of Cato and his fellow legislators in 
voting for the law. Gaius, as a life-tenured judge who need not worry 
about political opposition, has less personal stake in the law than do 
Cato and his cohort. Even if Gaius upholds the law, his comparative 
impartiality might persuade those who disagree with his decision 
nonetheless to accept it as authoritative. 
In short, the sources of constitutional authority on the Footnote 
Four account are both multiple and relatively abstract. The absence 
of a specific decision by the Framers does not frustrate authority on 
that account, unlike on a Framing-focused Moral Guidance approach, 
both because there are other relatively impartial decision-makers 
available—previous Courts, or the Court deciding the issue at 
hand—and because impartiality might flow from obedience to a 
general rule established by the Framers or a prior Court even if there 
is no specific on-point decision. 
3. The problem of disagreement revisited 
Finally, a person’s substantive disagreement with a 
constitutional command need not undermine the perceived authority 
of that command on the Footnote Four approach. We can agree that 
a process is impartial without agreeing with the substantive result 
that process generates. More to the point, a belief that a result is 
wrong need not undermine our faith in the impartiality of the 
process that produced it. 
On a Moral Guidance approach, remember, Cato’s disagreement 
with the requirements of the Due Process Clause in his case serves 
as a reason to question the basis of the Clause’s authority, namely 
the supposedly superior moral wisdom of the process that created 
the Clause. On the Footnote Four account, in contrast, Cato’s 
disagreement with the Clause need not affect his belief in the 
 
 160. See supra notes 157–159 and accompanying text. 
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Clause’s authority at all. That authority flows from relative 
impartiality, not from moral wisdom, and the fact that a process 
generates a morally disagreeable result is not (necessarily) a reason 
to question its impartiality. Cato’s view that the Clause is (in his 
case) wrong need not imply that the Framing that created the 
Clause, or the subsequent Courts that have interpreted it, lacked 
impartiality. 
The same holds true for a judge like Gaius who must decide 
whether to enforce the Clause—but with a wrinkle. While Cato is a 
part of the democratic political process, Gaius is himself a part of the 
constitutional process whose supposed impartiality justifies 
imposing constitutional law on democratic politics. For Gaius, 
therefore, there are two aspects to the question of constitutional 
authority: whether he himself has a duty to obey the Constitution in 
making his decision, and whether others will perceive a duty to obey 
his decision once it is made. Like Cato, Gaius can disagree with the 
substance of the Due Process Clause and still, on a Footnote Four 
approach, decide to obey the Clause on the ground that it derives 
from a relatively impartial process. And by demonstrably obeying the 
Clause in his decision—by convincingly tying that decision to some 
decision of the Framers or of a predecessor Court, for example—
Gaius can advertise his impartiality to others and thus can persuade 
others to obey the interpretation he renders. 
At bottom, then, the Footnote Four account is more plausible 
than the Framing-focused version of Moral Guidance. Its 
requirements for constitutional authority, both generally and at the 
level of particular cases, are less demanding and thus more likely to 
be satisfied in practice. And it does not undermine itself by making a 
person’s disagreement with the content of the law a reason to 
question the law’s authority. 
4. A caveat 
All is not entirely rosy with Footnote Four, however. It seems 
likely that substance—that is, the moral content of constitutional 
law—will turn out to be relevant at some level on that account. This 
likelihood resurrects the specter of disagreement and its potential to 
undermine constitutional authority. But the specter does not seem 
quite so frightening on the Footnote Four account as on Moral 
Guidance approaches. 
Substance, first of all, might be seen as relevant to impartiality. If 
constitutional procedures consistently generate one-sided results—
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always favoring the government, say—at some point citizens will 
reasonably question the supposed impartiality of those procedures. 
So it is possible that a person’s disagreement with a constitutional 
command will serve as evidence, for that person, that the 
constitutional process is not so impartial after all—and thus that she 
has no obligation to obey it. 
I believe this possibility is less threatening to the Footnote Four 
account, however, than the analogous possibility is to a Moral 
Guidance account. On the latter account, one’s disagreement with 
the substance of a command is direct evidence against the moral 
wisdom of the constitutional process—that is, against its claim to 
authority. On Footnote Four, though, one’s disagreement with the 
substance of a command is only indirect evidence against the 
impartiality, and thus the authority, of the process. That a procedure 
is wrong does not necessarily imply that the procedure is partial. 
Absent non-substantive evidence of partiality—some salient 
favoritism in the relevant procedures, for example—it will take a 
pattern of incorrect results, all in the same direction (for the 
government, say), to constitute strong evidence of partiality. And 
remember that the impartiality question is a comparative one: the 
constitutional process need not be perfectly impartial, just impartial 
enough as compared to ordinary politics to be capable of resolving 
certain disputes. 
It also is possible, though, that substance will matter without 
regard to impartiality. Even a procedure that is accepted as 
sufficiently impartial might still be rejected on the ground that it is 
not sufficiently likely to produce substantively good results. 
(Consider a coin toss—a perfectly impartial procedure that few 
would endorse for important decisions, simply because a fifty-
percent accuracy rate will not be viewed as high enough.) In other 
words, we might also care about the competence of a dispute-
resolution procedure, not just its impartiality.161 If so, then the 
specter of substantive disagreement reappears, threatening to 
undercut the perceived authority of a command someone thinks is 
substantively wrong. 
Again, however, this threat seems less severe than on a Moral- 
Guidance account, for two related reasons. First, competence is not 
the primary basis of authority on the Footnote Four approach; it 
 
 161. On this point, considered in the context of legal authority generally, see PETERS, supra 
note 42, at 75–78. 
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operates more as a side constraint, disqualifying suitably impartial 
procedures that are simply too incompetent to be acceptable. Doubts 
about a procedure’s competence might be overcome by 
demonstrations of its superior impartiality. On a Moral Guidance 
account, however, competence—the possession of superior moral 
wisdom—is the raison d’être of constitutional authority. Doubts about 
the Constitution’s superior wisdom go to the very heart of its 
authority; there is no other factor to outweigh them. 
Second, while impartiality is assessed comparatively on the 
Footnote Four account, competence is not. Constitutional 
procedures must be considerably more impartial on the relevant 
questions than the ordinary democratic alternatives. But they need 
not be considerably more competent than those alternatives. 
Competence, again, is a side constraint; impartiality drives 
constitutional authority on Footnote Four. 
So someone who disagrees with a constitutional command is less 
likely to reject its authority for that reason, I think, on the Footnote 
Four account than on a Moral Guidance account. This does not mean 
the problem of substantive disagreement is trivial or nonexistent on 
Footnote Four. But it suggests, especially given the other advantages 
of that approach, that the Footnote Four version of Dispute 
Resolution is the best account available to justify constitutional 
authority. 
E. “Interpretation” vs. “Construction” Revisited 
I argued in Part VI.C above that a Footnote Four account 
strengthens, or perhaps broadens, the authority of constitutional law 
by making authority possible in cases where it is missing on the 
Framing-focused approach: cases where original meaning runs out or 
where, even if original meaning is determinate, the Framers did not 
foresee the particular circumstances at hand. This point is 
independently interesting, because it reveals a significant problem 
with the New Originalist distinction between constitutional 
“interpretation” and constitutional “construction” that I discussed in 
Part III.A. 
In New Originalist terminology, remember, “interpretation” is 
the process of determining the (original) meaning of the 
Constitution’s text and “construction” is the process of resolving a 
case that is not determinately resolved by this (original) meaning. 
The distinction is a step in the right direction for originalism, as it 
acknowledges the need to resolve the (many) constitutional cases in 
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which the text alone is underdeterminate. But the distinction begs 
an important question: where does a court’s authority to engage in 
“construction” come from? 
We have now canvassed (most of) the accounts of constitutional 
authority that might be thought to support originalism.162 What is 
remarkable is that none of them, with the exception of Footnote 
Four (which entails only modest, selective originalism), can 
authorize constitutional construction, even assuming the account 
itself is valid. 
Barnett’s Values Imposition account purports to justify the 
authority of constitutional interpretation—identification of original 
meaning—on the ground that the Framers acted to enshrine the 
correct principles of natural justice. But courts are not the Framers. 
There is no guarantee that a court engaging in construction—moving 
beyond original meaning—will protect natural rights, or even 
attempt to do so. And so there is no basis for obedience to judicial 
constructions of the Constitution on Barnett’s account. (Unless, that 
is, Barnett is willing to claim that courts, or at least the Supreme 
Court, have a special ability and inclination to protect natural rights, 
which would be a form of Court-focused Moral Guidance account. In 
any event, Barnett does not make such a claim to my knowledge.) 
Similarly, a Consent account holds that “the People” who framed 
the Constitution have legitimate authority over subsequent 
generations acting through normal politics. But the Court is not the 
People; an act of judicial construction of the Constitution is not an 
act of popular sovereignty. So judicial constructions cannot be 
authoritative on a Consent approach. 
For its part, a Framing-focused Moral Guidance account derives 
authority from the supposedly superior moral wisdom of the 
Framing. As we’ve seen, that authority runs out when the Framers’ 
judgments run out—for instance, when there is no determinate 
original meaning. But that is precisely where the process of judicial 
construction is supposed to begin. Where does the authority of that 
process come from? 
The analysis so far suggests there are only two potential sources 
of authority for judicial construction. One is a Court-focused variety 
of Moral Guidance—a theory that the superior wisdom of 
 
 162. “Most of,” because one type of account remains to be addressed: what I call a Rule of 
Law account. See infra Part VI.H. 
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adjudication can pick up the slack where the (even-more-superior) 
wisdom of the Framing gives out. I am not aware of an originalist 
who has taken this approach or of a Court-focused Moral Guidance 
theorist who has endorsed anything like strong originalism. A theory 
holding that both the Framing and the Court are morally wiser than 
the ordinary democratic process might be too much to take.163 
The other possibility is a Footnote Four approach. Judges engage 
in construction because they need to do so to resolve cases, and 
because it is better to resolve certain cases through (relatively 
impartial) constitutional procedures then to leave them to be 
“resolved,” with partiality, by ordinary politics. Of course, an 
acknowledgment that judges can make constitutional law 
authoritatively, without rigid originalist methodology, would raise 
the question of just what originalism buys us in the first place. If 
Footnote Four can justify construction, why can’t it justify 
interpretation too? And if it can justify interpretation, the 
interpretation it justifies will, as we have seen, be only selectively 
originalist. 
To put the point bluntly: Footnote Four looks like the best 
available normative grounding for what New Originalists call 
constitutional construction. And this fact calls into question the 
existence of any other normative grounding for constitutional 
interpretation in the New Originalist sense. It cannot be the case that 
the best method of constitutional interpretation is entailed by one 
theory of constitutional authority and the best method of 
constitutional construction by an entirely different theory. If 
interpretation and construction are both legitimately authoritative 
procedures, then we must locate a single plausible theory of 
authority that is capable of justifying both of them. 
F. The Jurisdictional Problem 
There is at least one more reason to prefer Footnote Four over 
Framing-focused Moral Guidance, which appears to be its closest 
rival. The reason is that Footnote Four can delineate the  
 
 
 163. An adherent of the Cynical Narrative presented in Part II.B might hypothesize that 
originalists shy away from Court-focused accounts because of the origins of contemporary 
originalism—as a device to critique liberal rulings of the Warren and early Burger Courts. 
Extolling the superior moral wisdom of the judicial process would sit uncomfortably alongside 
claims that the judicial process has produced many unwarranted “activist” results. 
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jurisdictional boundaries of constitutional law while Framing-
focused accounts cannot. 
Recall that Framing-focused accounts necessarily attribute to the 
Framers (or to the Framing process more generally) an extremely 
broad moral wisdom—broad enough to explain the authority, not 
just of what the Framers put into the Constitution, but also of what 
the Framers left out of it.164 This breadth is problematic, not only 
because it seems implausible as a descriptive matter, but also 
because it implies a virtually unlimited scope of potential 
constitutional authority. The Framers (arguably) did not include 
rights to education or health care in the Constitution. But had they 
chosen to include those rights in the document, that choice would 
have been authoritative—just as their choice not to include them is 
authoritative in fact. 
If this is true of the (hypothetical) rights to education and health 
care, it is true of virtually anything—of any imaginable constitutional 
rule or command on any imaginable subject. (It is true, at least, of 
any command on any subject that could have been thought of by the 
Framers.) The Framers could have included a right to pet ownership 
in the Constitution, and we would be bound by that right. The 
Framers could have required members of Congress to wear silly 
paper hats, and we would be bound by that requirement. (In fact, 
many people think that some of the provisions the Framers did 
include in the Constitution—the Electoral College,165 the natural-
born citizenship requirement to be President,166 equal state 
representation in the Senate167—are nearly this ridiculous.) Thus 
there is no discernible limit to the content of constitutional law on a 
Framing-focused account. Put another way, there is no subject to 
which the Constitution’s potential jurisdiction does not extend. 
This might not seem like a real problem, given that the content 
of the Constitution is limited; the Framers did not in fact include a 
requirement that congressmen wear silly hats. But it might become a 
problem if we take seriously the New Originalists’ 
interpretation/construction distinction. That distinction recognizes 
the authority of judges to, in essence, create constitutional law 
 
 164. See supra Part V.D.1. 
 165. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2–4; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 166. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 167. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
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beyond the confines of original meaning. And while there are a 
number of New Originalist theories about how judges should 
exercise that authority, there is no agreement on the point.168 So it 
is conceivable that even an originalist judge, engaging in 
construction, could go far beyond the content imagined by the 
Framers and add something unprecedented, even radical, to 
constitutional law—perhaps not a silly-hats requirement, but maybe 
a right to, well, education or health care.169 And while originalists 
might perhaps devise theories of construction that would prevent 
this, nothing in the grounding of constitutional authority itself 
would do so. 
Consider also the question of what might legitimately be added 
to the Constitution, not by judicial construction, but through the 
formal Article V amendment process. Was it legitimate (albeit 
unwise) to constitutionalize Prohibition via the Eighteenth 
Amendment?170 Would it be legitimate (wise or not) to add an 
amendment prohibiting flag-burning? An amendment prohibiting 
(or guaranteeing the right to) same-sex marriage? Moral Guidance 
accounts have no answers to these questions; they can provide no 
theory of the proper jurisdiction of constitutional law. 
Footnote Four, in contrast, implies a theory of constitutional 
jurisdiction. On that account, the Constitution’s authority is 
grounded in the relative impartiality of the constitutional process 
with respect to certain kinds of issues—issues where there is reason 
to suspect entrenched bias in democratic politics. While there will 
almost always be room to argue about whether particular issues fall 
within this set, the set is not infinite, and there are governing 
principles for deciding what is inside it and what is not. Ely himself, 
for example, thought that Roe v. Wade was illegitimate because it 
could not be justified as a representation-reinforcing measure.171 I 
can’t think of a plausible Footnote Four argument justifying the 
Eighteenth Amendment, or amendments banning flag-burning or 
same-sex marriage. (I can think of one for an amendment allowing  
 
 
 168. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 76–79. 
 169. Again, Lawrence Sager makes a reasonable argument that these kinds of rights can be 
implied from the constitutional text. See SAGER, supra note 129, at 84–92, 129–60. 
 170. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. Const. amend. XXI. 
 171. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920 (1973). 
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same-sex marriage—one based on the stigma attached to its denial—
though it is hardly a slam-dunk.172) 
Again, there is room for debate on (most of) these issues. But 
Footnote Four gives us an analytical framework with which to 
engage in those debates. Moral Guidance requires us to throw up our 
hands and say “anything goes.” 
G. Moral Guidance or Dispute Resolution? 
So far I have been writing as if the Moral Guidance and Dispute 
Resolution approaches are mutually contradictory. Of course they 
are not; one might attempt to justify constitutional law on both 
grounds, although this might seem like overkill. More modestly, a 
single approach might be understood, in the alternative, as grounded 
either in Moral Guidance or in Dispute Resolution. And in fact a 
number of prominent accounts of constitutional law can be read this 
way. 
Consider Hamilton’s arguments for the authority of the 
Constitution generally (the “solemn and authoritative act” that 
trumps the “momentary inclination[s]” of ordinary politics)173 and 
judicial review in particular (“the independence of the judges” that 
protects rights against occasional “ill humors . . . among the 
people”).174 These points easily can be recast as asserting, not the 
superior moral wisdom of the Framing or of the adjudicative process, 
but rather the comparative impartiality of those processes. Hamilton, 
that is, might reasonably be understood as a nascent Footnote Four 
theorist, not a Moral Guidance theorist.175 
We can perform the same shift in perspective to read the 
“democratic dualism” of Bruce Ackerman as a kind of Footnote Four 
theory, exalting “higher lawmaking” not for its extraordinary 
judgment but for its exceptional fairness.176 Court-focused theories 
 
 172. For some thoughts on the jurisdictional limits of constitutional law under a 
somewhat expanded version of Footnote Four, with particular reference to Roe and other 
“substantive” due process decisions, see PETERS, supra note 42, at 267–72. 
 173. Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 440; see supra text accompanying note 119. 
 174. Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 440; see supra text accompanying note 126. 
 175. And not a Consent theorist either, though elements of his rhetoric in The Federalist 
would support a consensualist reading. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 176. In We the People: Foundations, Ackerman mentions Ely only twice, and then rather 
dismissively. See ACKERMAN, supra note 85, at 7, 9. He extensively analyzes the actual Footnote 
Four of Carolene Products as an example of judicial “synthesis,” see id. at 119–30, but does not 
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might be reread in this way as well: the special “capacities for 
dealing with matters of principle” that Alexander Bickel and others 
(Eisgruber, Sager, Dworkin) attribute to courts177 might consist 
primarily of impartiality rather than wisdom. 
This is not to say that any of these theorists would endorse, or 
would have endorsed, the Footnote Four approach, or that every 
aspect of each of their theories is consistent with it. But it is to 
suggest another point in favor of Footnote Four: it is a relatively 
“Catholic” approach, adaptable to different particular arguments 
about the nature of the Framing or of adjudication. 
H. The Rule of Law 
Finally, I need to engage with a sort of Dispute Resolution 
account that might be thought to support relatively strong 
originalism. Lawrence Solum cites as a “familiar justification for 
originalism” the “great value of the rule of law and its associated 
values, predictability, certainty, and stability of legal rules.”178 This 
suggests what we might call a Rule of Law account of constitutional 
authority: obedience to the Constitution is required in order to serve 
these rule-of-law values. 
We can understand the Rule of Law account as a type of Dispute 
Resolution account, one that is very close to the basic Hobbesian 
narrative. Disagreement about what should be done, including 
disagreement about what the law is, undermines “predictability, 
certainty, and stability.” Obedience to the Constitution avoids this 
costly disagreement, and (the suggestion goes) originalist 
interpretation of the Constitution enhances its capacity for dispute-
avoidance.179 
The Rule of Law account thus emerges as a potential alternative 
to Footnote Four within the Dispute Resolution spectrum. Note 
that, as a type of Dispute Resolution account, the Rule of Law 
shares—perhaps even improves upon—Footnote Four’s conceptual 
advantages as an account of constitutional authority. It provides a 
 
address the potential implications of its framework for the question of constitutional authority. 
Indeed, Ackerman is noncommittal and difficult to decipher on the question of authority. At 
bottom, I can find nothing in his arguments that rules out reading them as expressions of a 
Footnote Four view of authority. 
 177. BICKEL, supra note 127, at 25; see supra text accompanying notes 127–130. 
 178. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 129. 
 179. For a general Dispute Resolution account of these rule-of-law values, see PETERS, 
supra note 42, at 107–19. 
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content-independent reason to obey constitutional law, namely the 
furtherance of predictability, certainty, and stability. It is not vitiated 
by the salient moral defects of the Framing: so long as the Framing 
generates predictable, certain, stable legal rules, it is irrelevant (on 
the Rule of Law account) how those rules were created. It is not 
frustrated by circumstances the Framers did not foresee: so long as a 
rule clearly applies to a case, it doesn’t matter that the Framers did 
not anticipate that case. And—an apparent advantage over Footnote 
Four—the Rule of Law rationale is not undermined in the least by 
the inevitability of substantive disagreement with the Constitution’s 
commands. Competence is irrelevant to the rule-of-law values; all 
that matters is clarity. 
There are two difficulties with the Rule of Law account as a 
defense of originalism, however. First and most importantly, the 
account (by itself) is unpersuasive as a justification of broad 
constitutional authority. Second, the account does not in fact entail 
originalism. 
1. Hobbes redux 
The Rule of Law account shares with the bare Hobbesian 
approach the view that it is more important that things be decided 
than that things be decided correctly.180 With respect to some 
aspects of constitutional law, this position seems unassailable. We 
need a foundational set of legal rules to, literally, constitute 
democracy—to specify basics like who makes, enforces, and 
interprets the laws, and how.181 These constitutive rules cannot 
continually be up for debate—otherwise democratic government 
could not function. It would be like trying to play a baseball game 
while the teams fight over how many strikes make an out. At the 
foundational, constitutive level, the “predictability, certainty, and 
stability of legal rules” is indeed at a premium. 
At some point, however, it ceases to be more important to have 
rules than to have rules that are correct, or at least correctly made. 
Once basic democratic government is up and running, after all, we 
 
 180. On the bare Hobbesian approach, see supra notes 143–146 and accompanying text; see 
also PETERS, supra note 42, at 57–61, 119–22. 
 181. On this point, see EISGRUBER, supra note 128, at 12 (citing STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS 
AND CONSTRAINTS 167–69 (1995)); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT 
CONSTITUTIONS DO 98 (2001); PETERS, supra note 42, at 243–46. 
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(the participants in that democracy) can make our own rules, 
democratically, to bring predictability, certainty, and stability to our 
world. Some additional justification is necessary if we are to 
continue subjugating our own rule-making authority to some 
supposedly higher, constitutional power. 
To be clear: the point here is not that the rule-of-law values cease 
to matter once the constitutive elements of working democracy are 
in place. The point is that those values by themselves become 
inadequate to justify constitutional law once that occurs. Once 
democracy itself is constituted sufficiently to make its own laws, 
those (democratically created) laws can begin to fulfill the rule-of-
law functions. We need some additional reason to think that 
(predictable, certain, stable) democratically created laws should be 
trumped by (predictable, certain, stable) constitutional commands. 
The Rule of Law account, by itself, cannot supply a persuasive 
reason, any more than Hobbes could persuasively explain why an 
absolutist monarchy was better than a democratic process for 
making laws. Of course, the greater the extent to which controversial 
issues are governed by rigid, difficult-to-change constitutional rules, 
the less democratic fighting there will be about these issues. In this 
sense, constitutional law might bring more predictability, certainty, 
and stability than ordinary democracy. But the same is true of 
Hobbesian absolutism, and yet, following Locke, Jefferson, and many 
others, we prefer democracy. Once the basic democratic ground rules 
are in place, it becomes, to us, more important that our laws be 
made in a way we find acceptable than that they simply exist, 
regardless of how they are made. 
Footnote Four offers a theory of why constitutional law is, on 
some topics, more acceptable than ordinary democracy. The Rule of 
Law account offers no such theory. It is unpersuasive as a 
justification of constitutional law beyond the bare-bones form 
necessarily to constitute democracy in a literal sense. 
2. Originalism and underdeterminacy 
Even if the Rule of Law account could justify constitutional 
authority, it would not entail originalism, at least not to a greater 
extent than the Footnote Four account entails it. This is because, as 
we have seen numerous times already, originalism is an endemically 
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underdeterminate methodology.182 The New Originalist distinction 
between “interpretation” and “construction” acknowledges that 
original meaning often, in Solum’s phrase, “runs out.”183 When this 
occurs, the rule-of-law values of predictability, certainty, and stability 
are threatened. Like Footnote Four, the Rule of Law account 
suggests that sources of law besides original meaning—principally 
case-by-case judicial decision-making—will be necessary to fill the 
resulting gaps in determinacy (on the Rule of Law account) or 
impartiality (on the Footnote Four account). 
Indeed, originalism might be even less determinate than New 
Originalists acknowledge. The problem is not simply that the 
Constitution’s text frequently is vague or ambiguous,184 but that it 
often will be very difficult to identify any reliable original meaning at 
all. David Strauss helpfully classifies the troubles here into three 
categories: “the problem of ascertainability, which is simply the 
difficulty of doing the historical research needed to figure out what 
the original understandings were”;185 “the problem of 
indeterminacy,” that is, the risk that members of the Framing 
generation had “different understandings about what the words have 
committed the document to”;186 and “the problem of translation,” or 
the difficulty of applying the particular understandings of the 
Framing generation to modern circumstances they could not have 
foreseen.187 An originalist interpreter must, first, locate relevant 
historical evidence regarding what the appropriate collection of 
people alive at the time of the Framing thought or intended the 
Constitution’s words to mean (and in so doing must decide what 
evidence is relevant, which collection of people is appropriate, and 
what understandings or beliefs or other mental states of those 
people matter). She must then determine whether some of the 
relevant mental states of some of the people in question are in 
conflict and, if so, what to do about it. And she must, finally, figure 
out how to apply those mental states—which were formed with 
 
 182. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.; supra text accompanying notes 63–72. 
 183. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 69. 
 184. A fact readily admitted by New Originalists. See id. at 69–74; BARNETT, LOST 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 118–21; WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 7, 209–12. 
 185. David Strauss, Remarks, Panel on Originalism and Precedent, in ORIGINALISM, supra note 
10, at 199, 218. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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reference to facts as they existed in the late eighteenth or mid-
nineteenth centuries—to the very different and unforeseen facts as 
they exist today. In light of these obstacles, we might think Justice 
Scalia is understating the matter when he admits that originalist 
methodology “is always difficult and sometimes inconclusive.”188 
Of course, if the rule-of-law values are behind at least the 
fundamental constitutive law of our democracy, then we need some 
relatively determinate methodology for identifying and 
understanding those rules. So it is no accident that many or most of 
the basic constitutive rules in our own Constitution are expressed 
using such determinate language that further interpretation is 
superfluous or nearly so. The power to make law is “vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate,”189 
“composed of two Senators from each State”190 serving terms of “six 
Years,”191 “and [a] House of Representatives,”192 “composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several 
States”193 and “apportioned among the several States . . . 
according to their respective Numbers . . . not [to] exceed one for 
every thirty Thousand.”194 The power to execute the law is “vested 
in a President” who “shall hold his Office during the Term of four 
Years.”195 And so on. 
In the end, a Rule of Law account can take us only so far. It can 
justify bare-bones constitutive rules of democracy but not 
constitutional law more generally. And it cannot justify anything 
approaching a thoroughgoing originalism, for the simple reason that 
originalist interpretation is inadequate to serve the rule-of-law 
values. 
VII. CONCLUSION: ECHOES OF THE CYNICAL NARRATIVE 
Let’s review. Methodologies of constitutional interpretation beg 
for theories of constitutional authority. I have argued here, in fact, 
 
 188. Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 12, at 864. 
 189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 191. Id. 
 192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
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that methodology presupposes an account of authority. Without an 
account of why the Constitution binds us, any approach to 
interpretation is bound to seem opportunistic, even cynical—an 
attempt to foist political results on the public in the name of 
constitutional law. 
I have argued also that the accounts of authority offered (or, 
often, assumed) by originalists prove unpersuasive. The pursuit of 
particular substantive values—“natural rights,” for example—is not a 
justification of authority at all; it is a question-begging sermon that 
will convert no one but the choir. The ideas that we have consented 
to an originalist Constitution, or that such a Constitution is an act of 
“popular sovereignty” that somehow binds us, stretch the concepts 
of “consent” and “sovereignty” beyond recognition. The notion that 
the Framing generated special moral wisdom that we cannot now 
hope to duplicate is both descriptively implausible and conceptually 
problematic. The rule-of-law values of predictability, certainty, and 
stability justify skeletal constitutional law at most, and they demand 
more determinacy than originalist methodology alone can provide. 
What is left is the Footnote Four account of constitutional 
authority—not a flawless account, to be sure, but a substantial 
improvement over its rivals. The problem for originalists is that 
Footnote Four can support only a selective, truncated form of 
originalism. This is not nothing; the idea that originalism is 
justifiable in any form at all might come as a surprise to some 
nonoriginalists. But it is not the sort of thoroughgoing originalism 
that the progenitors of contemporary originalism seem to have had 
in mind,196 and it probably is not even the kind of presumptive 
originalism that New Originalists advocate—an originalism that is 
always the first resort and that often is sufficient to resolve 
constitutional cases. 
If New Originalists want thicker ice to skate on, they need to do 
more to develop a convincing account of constitutional authority that 
also entails the methodology they endorse. I am skeptical that such 
an account is available, but New Originalist theory has proven 
remarkably imaginative. Unless and until this happens, originalists 
might find it difficult to escape the echoes of the Cynical Narrative—
the lingering suspicion that their methodology is just a sophisticated 
cover for controversial political commitments. 
 
 196. See sources cited supra note 10. 
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